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ABSTRACT 
 
The research involves an examination of the basis the National War in Nicaragua from 
1854-1857. The purpose is to show how the social, cultural, and political antecedents led to the 
National War. This has been done by focusing on William Walker and Padre Agustín Vijil. 
William Walker was the American filibuster invited to Nicaragua in 1855 by the Liberals to aid 
them in the year old civil war with the Conservatives. Walker took control of the Nicaraguan 
government, first through a puppet president. He became president himself in July of 1856. 
Padre Agustín Vijil encountered Walker in October of 1855 and provided an example of the 
support given to Walker by Nicaraguans. Though Walker would be forced to leave Nicaragua in 
1857, the intersection between these individuals sheds light on actions shaping the National War.  
 
  
iv 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
ABSTRACT.................................................................................................................................. iii 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION................................................................................................... 1 
CHAPTER 2: NICARAGUA AFTER INDEPENDENCE, 1801-1854……............................... 13 
CHAPTER 3: BEHIND GREY EYES ……................................................................................ 45 
CHAPTER 4: LA GUERRA NACIONAL……………................................................................72 
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION..................................................................................................... 98  
BIBLIOGRAPHY.................................................................................................................................. 101  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1855, the leaders of Nicaragua’s Liberal Party sent emissaries to San Francisco, 
California. They were ordered to acquire the services of an exceptionally well-known soldier of 
fortune, William Walker. These emissaries were authorized to offer Walker both monetary 
reimbursement and promises of land in Nicaragua in exchange for his services in overthrowing 
the Conservative government of Nicaragua, then based in the city of Granada.1 Liberal leaders 
welcomed Walker with open arms when he and a band of fifty-seven mercenaries arrived at the 
port of Realejo on June 16, 1855. From this port city, the Liberal Party members escorted Walker 
to the small city of Chinandega. Along the route, numerous citizens of Nicaragua rang church 
bells to greet the arrival of Walker and his forces. Eventually, Walker was brought to the nation’s 
largest city of León, the center of power for Nicaragua’s Liberal forces. Here, Walker was 
welcomed by Liberal leader Francisco Castellón. His newfound employers charged him to fight 
against the Granada Conservatives.2  
During the mid-nineteenth century, a filibuster was a military adventurer who traveled to 
foreign countries to wage war. Actions such as this were specifically illegal, barred by the United 
States Neutrality Act of 1818. The efforts of the filibusters thus violated United States law, and 
occasionally brought the United States into conflict with the great powers of Britain, France, and 
Spain. Moreover, it established a legacy of distrust of American intentions in Nicaragua and 
Central America. Nonetheless, Liberals were eager to draw upon the support of Walker. 
 
                                                 
1 Jamison 1909, 12. 
2 Pérez and Chamorro 1975, 226. 
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 Though present-day Nicaraguans look back on the Walker invasion with contempt, 
Walker was warmly upon his arrival on the shores of Nicaragua in 1855. Walker would come to 
rule the Central American nation for a relatively brief time, but Nicaragua would remember him 
as the leader of an invading force with the intention of destroying Nicaraguan culture and 
subjugating them to U.S. imperialism. Walker is also remembered for assuming the presidency 
of the Nicaraguan government in a fraudulent election, restoring slavery, and establishing 
English as a national language of Nicaragua.3 What is less remembered is that Walker and his 
forces were not an invading horde but were, in actuality, invited to play their part in Nicaraguan 
history. The Liberal leaders of Nicaragua did not seek out Walker randomly; they had been 
impressed by his efforts as a “filibuster” in his failed invasion of Mexico. 
Nicaragua’s Liberal leaders, in fact, planned for the U.S. force to settle down in 
Nicaragua. All those that came with Walker were given Nicaraguan citizenship, and the land that 
they were provided as part of their service was to encourage them to remain as colonists. Liberal 
elites had high hopes for these colonists to create in Nicaragua the modernity of the United 
States. In later decades, authors such as José Enrique Rodó would warn against an overreliance 
on the United States as a model for modernization.4 But the Liberal elites in 1855 took the 
opposite point of view, and they were not alone in their belief in William Walker.5 Non-elite 
citizens of Nicaragua were also excited about the arrival of Walker and his forces and continued 
to back him even as he took control of their country and made arrangements for nearly ten 
thousand men and women to follow him in colonizing Nicaragua.6 One of Walker’s associates, 
William Caseneau, noted that “Nicaragua is rich in a vast extent of public domain of 
                                                 
3 Walker 1985, 260. 
4 Rodó 2006, 91. 
5 Burns 1991, 197-218. 
6 Bolaños Geyer 1988 141-142. 
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incomparable beauty and fertility, which is open to the whole world by a liberal plan of 
colonization.”7 In addition to colonizing, many of the men from the United States chose to take 
Nicaraguan wives. The elite families of Nicaragua presented opportunities for poor settlers from 
the United States to marry their daughters to further strengthen these connections.8  
 Walker’s popularity was secured by his relatively quick victory over the Conservative 
armies. On October 13, 1855 Walker successfully took possession of the Conservative capital in 
Granada with his U.S. forces and approximately 300 Nicaraguan volunteers.  Walker took the 
citizens of Granada hostage, and forced the Conservative generals to surrender. Overall, 
however, his control of Nicaragua was contingent on his support among the local populace. A 
clear example of this support was the sermon made by Padre Agustín Vijil the day after Walker’s 
victory in Granada.  
On that day, Padre Vijil referred to William Walker as the North Star, calling him a 
guardian angel of peace.9 The fact that his words were delivered at La Merced, the primary 
church in Granada, gave them particular significance. On February 16, 1856, Vijil wrote 
“Ever since General Walker stepped on the soil of Granada, from the moment that I had 
the pleasure of embracing him in my arms, and I heard from his lips words of peace, of 
public quiet, of reconciliation, which are ideas equal to mine. I looked upon him as the 
Maccabee of my people and I named him the man sent to us by God to wipe away tears, 
to heal wounds, and to reconcile the Nicaraguan family.”10 
 
                                                 
7 Caseneau 1856. 
8 Jamison 1909, 109. 
9Vijil 1930, 151-155. 
10 El Nicaraguense, February 16, 1856. 
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Vijil’s point of view reflected the beliefs held by the supporters of U.S. involvement, arguing for 
the beneficence of Walker’s arrival as he hailed from a civilized nation. Vijil, amongst others, 
believed that Walker and American colonists would be able to aid in ending the social, political, 
and economic turmoil that had plagued Nicaragua for decades since their independence from 
Spanish rule. Walker appeared to agree with his role in Nicaragua; he noted in his book, The War 
in Nicaragua, “The history of the world presents no such Utopian vision as that of an inferior 
race yielding meekly and peacefully to the controlling influence of a superior people.”11 At least 
initially, the elites and populace of Nicaragua agreed with their understanding of Walker’s 
vision.  
 In retrospect, the welcoming response of Nicaraguans to Walker in 1855 seems 
extraordinarily confusing. With the benefit of hindsight, Nicaraguans today are aware of the 
devastation and violence Walker brought to Nicaragua. Walker received a surprising degree of 
support for his takeover from Nicaraguans, and the social and cultural situation in Nicaragua that 
allowed support for Walker to develop has not been fully examined. The desire for peace 
following years of war and for modernity following years of privation led many to wish to 
believe in Walker as a panacea for the problems facing Nicaragua. A great deal of scholarly 
attention has been paid to the efforts of filibusters like Walker, their conquests, and the impact 
that their unsanctioned belligerence had on U.S. diplomacy in this period. In order to gain a 
deeper understanding of these events the study of filibustering must be expanded to understand 
the involvement of the Nicaraguan people and the impact that the conquest and filibustering 
movements had on them and the nation of Nicaragua.  
                                                 
11 Walker 1985, 430. 
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No one more exemplifies the contradictions inherent in Walker’s Nicaraguan support 
than Padre Agustín Vijil. Padre Vijil offered his wholehearted support to the filibuster from the 
United States and administered to him the oath of office when he became the Commander in 
Chief of the Nicaraguan military. Vijil additionally offered the support of the Catholic Church, 
which aided in eliminating concerns over a Protestant ruler in Nicaragua. Padre Vijil would 
become the first ambassador of the new Nicaraguan government to the United States and the 
only ambassador from the Walker government recognized by the United States. Vijil supported 
the Liberal elites in their plans for Nicaragua and was also known to the Conservative elites due 
to his many years serving in Granada. A study of the support provided by Agustin Vijil will 
allow us to understand the support provided by the Liberal and even Conservative elites in 
Nicaragua to William Walker. Additionally, examining the support for the Walker government 
by the Catholic Church and the associated priesthood will enable us to evaluate and come to a 
greater understanding of why the populace remained loyal to Walker for as long as they did.  
 
Historiographical Antecedents 
In Nicaragua, the first complete analysis of the National War was provided by Jerónimo 
Pérez in a two-volume history entitled Memorias para la historia de la revolución de Nicaragua 
y de la Guerra Nacional Contra los Filibusteros, 1854-1857.  Published in 1865, this was the 
first extensive examination of the conflict from a Central American voice. This was expanded 
upon by the Guatemalan biographer Lorenzo Montúfar in his book Walker en Centroamérica. In 
1895, a pamphlet by Francisco Rodriquez Camacho entitled Glorias de Costa Rica: Pincelados 
sobre las guerras de Centro América en los Años de 1856 y 1857 provided a limited history of 
the campaign itself, focusing on the battles of Santa Rosa and Rivas and the capture of San Juan 
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del Norte. A further fragmentary Costa Rican account of the National War was provided by 
Máximo Soto Hall in Episodos Nacionales,1856-1857 in 1902.  
A significant analytic theme of study between 1910 and 1960 was the examination of 
Costa Rican military operations in the National War and the impact of the conflict on creating a 
national identity in Costa Rica. Costa Rican historian Carlos Méndez produced two studies on 
the Costa Rican national hero Juan Santamaría and the battle in which he earned his reputation. 
Méndez’s account is notable in that he located a series of interviews with veterans of the 
National War, recorded in 1891. Gutiérrez Mata emphasized Costa Rican military life on a day 
to day basis. This historical analysis focused on specific events of note, but offered little insight 
into the cultural and social impact of the National War. Closer examination of the community 
response to the National War in Costa Rica was provided by Juan Rafael Quesada in his book 
Clarin patriotico: la guerra contra los filibusteros y la nacionalidad costarricence.  The primary 
emphasis of this study was on the genesis of a Costa Rican national character through the events 
of the National War.  Despite this, scholars have done very little work on the social and cultural 
impact of the National War in Nicaragua itself, or the role of the people of that nation in the 
actions of William Walker. 
Many examinations of the National War focus on analysis of the filibusters themselves. 
In 1963, historian Albert Z. Carr reviewed the life of William Walker and his followers with an 
emphasis on their grandiose plans for the future of Central America. His biographical 
examination of Walker established the basic details of his life and motivations for travel to 
Nicaragua. Carr’s analysis is an excellent starting point despite being overly fond of the Walker 
himself. The more general origins of the filibustering movements have been examined by 
Charles Brown in his work Agents of Manifest Destiny: The Lives and Times of the Filibusters 
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and William O. Scroggs in his book Filibusters and Financiers.  Scroggs’ 1916 work provided 
one of the first historical examinations of the filibusters and the forces underlying filibusterism. 
In particular, he examined the financial motives of those that supported the filibusters in the 
United States. Brown’s more recent work continued in that vein, though provided primarily a 
biographical sketch of Walker and his fellow adventurer’s. Such works provide us insight into 
the type of individual that chose to make these expeditions of conquest in the nineteenth century 
from a primarily biographical stance. The works of this period also tend to focus on events from 
the United State point of view. Historian James McPherson examined filibustering from a more 
generalized perspective in his book Battle Cry of Freedom. McPherson’s book is greatly 
successful in placing the activities of filibusters in the context of the coming of the United States 
Civil War. While valuable, this work emphasizes the filibusters as part of the United States 
sectional disputes without examination of a broader context.  
The most nuanced work examining the filibusters has been provided by historian Robert 
May in his 2002 book Manifest Destiny’s Underworld: Filibustering in Antebellum America. 
May’s analysis examined the role of the United States government in conjunction with the 
filibusters. He also goes further in his examination of Walker’s motives, detailing both his stated 
motives and other less obvious motivations for the filibustering movement. As with McPherson, 
May focused on the role of filibustering in a United States context. May, however, goes further 
in examining the role of filibustering in the social history of the United States.  In 1992, 
Alejandro Bolanos Geyer provided a Nicaraguan analysis of the war in his book, William 
Walker, El Prestinado. Geyer’s work made extensive use of previous historical workin in once 
again focusing primarily on a biographical study of William Walker. 
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The connection of the Catholic Church to the filibustering movement has also been 
examined, albeit only minimally. Manzar Foroohar addressed this involvement and the effects it 
had on Nicaraguan society and culture in his book The Catholic Church and Social Change in 
Nicaragua.  Though the major focus of Foroohar’s book is on the period following 1968, the 
author also traces the historical development of the Catholic Church in Nicaragua from colonial 
times through the twentieth century. His examination of the National War is brief, but does 
provide context for the involvement of the Church in the development of Nicaragua following 
independence. Philip J. Williams provided additional analysis in The Catholic Church and 
Politics in Nicaragua and Costa Rica, arguing that the development of the Church in both 
Nicaragua and Costa Rica needs to be understood in the appropriate political and socio-economic 
context. As with Foroohar, Williams focus on the development of the Church over the entirety of 
Central American history yields insights though they are not focused on the early national 
development of Nicaragua. John Kirk added to the body of literature concerning the Catholic 
Church in his 1992 book Politics and the Church in Nicaragua. Once again, however the focus is 
on the Catholic Church near the end of the twentieth century. The colonial and post-colonial 
development of the Church is examined primarily to provide context for analysis of the present 
Church. Each of these studies is useful in establishing a contextual basis for the examination of 
Nicaragua politics and religion, although their examination of the National War is exceptionally 
brief.  
More recent analysis has focused on the role played by Nicaraguan elites in Walker’s 
government, such as the 2005 work by Michel Gobat, Confronting the American Dream: 
Nicaragua Under U.S. Imperial Rule. Gobat’s work covers a far greater period of time than the 
National War, but does include examination of the involvement by Nicaraguans themselves in 
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both the National War and beyond. Steven Palmer also examined the National War as an 
important element of national identity formation for the nations of Guatemala and Costa Rica in 
his dissertation “A Liberal Discipline: Inventing Nations in Guatemala and Costa Rica, 1870-
1900.” Both of these works provide a greater understanding of the impact of the National War, 
but once again do it in the context of the national impact of other nations without primary 
emphasis on Nicaragua. 
 
Sources and Methods 
 The examination of the social and cultural support for William Walker in both the United 
States and Nicaragua will be done through a deeper look at one of his supporters, Padre Agustín 
Vijil, and through the cultural milieu that allowed Walker’s adventurism in the first place. 
Agustín Vijil presents an opportunity to examine both the position of the Nicaraguan elites and 
to aid in understanding why the local populace came to support a Protestant conquistador. 
Through this lens we can begin to understand the state of the Nicaraguan nation and the 
difficulties that led it to invite a filibuster from the United States into their midst.  
The contemporary accounts concerning filibustering offer an excellent beginning body of 
research to evaluate the impacts of filibustering. William Walker’s defense of his own actions 
was published in 1860 as The War in Nicaragua. The book’s purpose was to engender support in 
the United States for his eventual return to Nicaragua. The story of his filibustering actions in his 
own words, however, provides an invaluable starting point for examination of the National War 
and Walker’s actions therein.  The popularity of filibustering in the consciousness of the United 
States led to several other accounts of the war. In 1886, C.W. Doubleday recorded his memories 
in the book Reminiscences of Filibuster War in Nicaragua. Along the same lines, James Carson 
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Jamison’s 1909 book With Walker in Nicaragua gave first-hand accounts of filibustering in this 
time period. Jamison’s book is particularly instructive due to extensive discussion of the local 
populace of Nicaragua and their interactions with the invaders from the North. Though each of 
these texts is obviously a highly biased account and represent only one perspective, they present 
an excellent source of information concerning the events of the National War. 
In addition to using published accounts, this study of the cultural impact of filibustering 
in Nicaragua has made use of archival resources found both in Nicaragua and the United States. 
The Archivo de la Prefectura in Granada originally housed material from the city councils and 
the courts. Unfortunately, numerous records were lost when Granada burned at the end of the 
National War. Despite this unfortunate loss the archive itself still maintains a collection of books 
and papers focused on the National War. The Archivo Nacional in Managua provided 
information on the executive, judicial, and legislative branches of government. This archive was 
also home to numerous documents concerning the National War as part of the Alberto Benrana 
Collection. In addition to these sources, the letters written and sermons presented by Padre Vijil 
as published in a biographical study are invaluable. These documents are essential for arriving at 
an accurate interpretation of the actions and motivations of Vijil and the Catholic Church in the 
period surrounding the National War. 
 In addition to these records, documents from the Tennessee Historical Society, the 
Library of Congress, and the Callendar I. Fayssoux papers housed at Tulane University served to 
provide further information. The Tennessee Historical Society has collected extensive 
information about the early years of Walker as well as his activities following his return from 
Nicaragua. The Fayssoux papers are the source for numerous correspondence between Walker 
and his supporters as well as newspaper analysis of his endeavors. Further information was 
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drawn from papers housed in the Library of Congress and the National Archives. Governmental 
correspondence between the United States and Nicaragua provided a significant source of 
information concerning the National War and Walker’s involvement. Moreover, these resources 
proved to host copies of the newspaper founded by Walker, El Nicaraguense, as well as 
information concerning Vijil’s brief time in the United States.  
 
Organization 
 This study, then, will begin by analyzing the history of Nicaragua in the decades 
preceding the National War, with particular attention to the life of Agustin Vijil and his role in 
the National War of Nicaragua. The first chapter will focus on establishing an understanding of 
Nicaraguan society after Independence and what it meant to be “elite” in Nicaragua prior to the 
National War. Following Independence, Nicaragua was a deeply divided nation politically, 
socially, and spiritually. An understanding of nature of these divisions is needed to understand 
exactly why intervention from the United States was not only tolerated but actively sought out 
The ideals and needs of the Nicaraguan state for such an intercession would depend on 
finding individuals willing to travel to their nation and provide such support. Chapter two will 
provide an examination of the the cultural milieu of William Walker. Had he arrived in 
Nicaragua solely as a conqueror it is unlikely he would have been welcomed. The idealism he 
represented can provide additional insight into why Vijil chose to support the man he referred to 
as the “Star of the North.” The third chapter will directly address La Guerra Nacional and the 
intersection of Vijil’s and Walker idealism. It is the contention of this thesis that a deeper 
understanding of the National War necessitates an understanding of how the visions of both 
Walker and Vijil coincided, superficially connected but with drastically different interpretations 
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that ended tragically for both men yet in their wake provided the national unity that Vijil had 
hoped for.  
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CHAPTER 2: NICARAGUA AFTER INDEPENDENCE, 1801-1854 
 
 On April 26, 1801, Agustín Vijil was born to Don Joaquín Fernández Vijil and Doña 
Dolores Selva Mayor. Agustín was the youngest of eleven children, preceded by seven sisters 
and three brothers. His father, Don Joaquín, was a prosperous individual, owning a profitable 
finca (farm) near Granada. Joaquín Fernández Vijil was one of the elites of the area, and strongly 
supportive of the conservative nature of the city he called home.12 His son, Agustín, quickly 
showed an impressive memory and aptitude. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the 
strongest education center in Nicaragua was in León. For this reason, Agustín was sent to the 
rival (and liberal) city of León. He completed his education there, and proceeded to attend the 
University of León as well. Thus, the man who was to be Padre Vijil served as an example of the 
tensions within Nicaragua and the difficult division between liberals and conservatives, between 
the elites of León and Granada. By birth Agustín was of Granada. By training and association 
with political figures and his fellow students in León, his political thinking tended to be liberal. 
Those conflicting influences would often place him in the middle of Nicaraguan national 
struggles, reflecting the difficulties inherent in the Central American drive to independence. 
 
The Road to Independence 
 Long before Vijil’s birth, Nicaragua was under Spanish imperial domination. As the once 
mighty Spanish empire faltered near the end of the eighteenth century, so too did its provinces in 
Central America. They experienced difficulties adapting to changing circumstances. As early as 
1768, the challenges faced by the colonies were communicated to no less than the king of Spain 
by cleric Pedro Cortés y Larraz when he found himself unable to fully explain the magnitude of 
                                                 
12 Vijil 1930, 1-2. 
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the situation. He noted “All acknowledge that… these Kingdoms find themselves in such a 
deplorable state… that one knows not how to make them believable.”13 The elites of Nicaragua 
searched for ways to improve their conditions and that of the Spanish Empire. They recognized 
that their future could be greatly enhanced with a greater source of commercial trade.  The only 
authorized trade route involved a circuitous journey through Guatemala City on to Omoa in 
Honduras. Such a difficult route made Nicaraguan trade unprofitable. At the beginning of the 
nineteenth century the economy of Nicaragua, minimal as it was, bore a decidedly local rather 
than international flavor. Most economic activity was self-sustaining and focused on the various 
communities. A report to the  Marqués de la Hornaza indicated a belief that an inter-oceanic 
route such as a canal would allow “This miserable and abandoned kingdom would be reborn and 
flourish… if overseas commerce could be conducted through the San Juan River and Lake 
Nicaragua.”14 The report further pointed to the significant difficulties placed on potential 
Nicaraguan development by the Spanish crown.  
 The cities of Granada and León controlled the economic activity of the small province of 
Nicaragua. Both cities developed to take advantage of the environment of Nicaragua. Western 
Nicaragua can be divided into three different environmental regions; the Pacific Coastal Zone, 
the Lacustrine Depression, and the Central Highlands. The rain drenched lowlands of Eastern 
Nicaragua were lightly populated, as was the Central Highlands. The population of Nicaragua in 
1821 was 186,00015 and was centered on the Pacific Coastal Zone and the Lacustrine 
Depression. The Pacific Coastal Zone included plains, volcanoes, and plateaus. More 
importantly, the rich volcanic soils of this region provided the most fertile farming region in 
                                                 
13 Cortés y Larraz, 1958, 11. 
14 Report to the Marques de la Hornaza as quoted in Burns 1991, 5. 
15 Woodward, 1985, 178. 
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Nicaragua.16 León’s founding focused on the advantages posed by the farmland in this region. 
Spanish explorers founded Granada in the Lacustrine Depression on Lake Nicaragua with the 
intent of finding a route to the Caribbean. This link was established via the San Juan River. 
Though not as rich as the Pacific Coastal Zone, the Lacustrine Depression provided excellent 
grazing land for another primary Nicaraguan economic endeavor, cattle. Both cities would 
historically compete for grazing land in this territory.17 The elites of both of these cities 
envisioned the creation of a vibrant economy making use of the natural advantages of their 
nation. Nicaragua. The rivers, lakes, and port cities on both oceans presented opportunities to 
increase trade. This emphasis on trade focused primarily on the needs of the elites, an 
exceptionally small portion of the Nicaraguan population. Much of the population focused on 
subsistence farming and raising cattle. Both of these industries, unfortunately, were consistently 
disrupted over the course of the early nineteenth century by the constant military struggles. 
The larger of the two cities, León, boasted a population that reached 32,000 by 1823 and 
served as a hub for politics, education, and religion in addition to its role as a commercial center. 
Although smaller, with a population of 10,223 people, Granada dominated the lands from 
Masaya to Rivas, and served as the primary merchant city based on the control it had over traffic 
across Lake Nicaragua and down the San Juan River. The rivalry between these two cities was 
primarily economic during the late colonial period. Nicaragua’s subsistence level of agricultural 
production led the Spanish government to focus on the more profitable colonies such as Mexico 
and Peru, exploiting the vast mineral wealth of Mexico or the trade opportunities growing in 
Buenos Aires. Mercantilistic restrictions placed on Nicaragua led Jaime Wheelock Román to 
                                                 
16 Radell, 1969, 22. 
17 Radell, 1968, 149. 
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characterize it as a “virtually closed subsistence economy.”18 Governor Crisano Sacada spoke for 
the elites of Nicaragua, vigorously arguing for freedom of trade in order to allow Nicaragua to 
export and flourish. Granadan resident Pedro José Chamorro repeated these concerns, but 
concentrated the blame on merchants and bureaucrats in Guatelama City. Chamorro allied with 
other provincial delegates in León in 1814 to petition the crown to remove Nicaragua and Costa 
Rica from Guatemalan control, raising it to an intendancy of its own.19  
The language within the petition highlighted both current and future difficulties in 
Central America, stating “What a contrast exists between the natural fertility, wealth, and 
abundance of these provinces and the poverty, misery, and depression in which they find 
themselves… The principle cause is the subjection to and dependence on Guatemala, so far away 
that we feel abandoned. The only way for us to achieve prosperity is to be independent of 
Guatemala.”20 These petitions were the results of resistance movements in Nicaragua in their 
efforts to gain independence. The contrast between the potential of Nicaragua and the poverty of 
the people would be a theme later addressed by Vijil, both before and during the National War. 
In 1811, León and Granada both acted to expel Spanish officials and assumed direct control. The 
Spanish crown sent forces at the beginning of 1812 to quell the insurrections. The authorities in 
León capitulated immediately; the Granadan contingent held out briefly and was harshly 
punished for their momentary resistance. The elites of Granada viewed this as a betrayal by 
León. While their economic interests aligned, they were together. Yet these actions during the 
late colonial period would severely harden the differences between the two cities and the view 
that neither was to be trusted with power.21 More immediately, however, the rivalry between the 
                                                 
18 Burns 1991, 8. 
19 Burns 1991, 10. 
20 Revista de la Academia de Geografia e Historia de Nicaragua, August, 1945 
21 Burns 1991, 15 
17 
 
various Central American provinces foretold difficult times for the region as the opportunity 
came for independence from Spanish rule and the formation of a Central American republic. 
 
A United and Divided Central America 
Vijil would come of age as Central American began its struggles for independence, 
struggles that would be particularly influential on the young man. In 1821, the newly formed 
Republic of Central America faced great difficulties in the aftermath of independence as the 
provinces of Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica joined. Strife 
generated from the economic and social climate following the colonial era engendered 
tumultuous political struggles and civil wars throughout most of the region. Despite this rocky 
future, the Republic was formed with high expectations among the leaders of Central America; 
these hopes were soon to be violently dashed in the years following independence. The vision of 
a united and prosperous isthmian empire were held up to the reality of conflicting city states and, 
equally importantly, conflicting desires of the elites holding power in their respective cities. It 
would be these desires that would spell an end to the Republic. Shortly before his death in 1830, 
Latin American political leader Simón Bolívar would state that “America is ungovernable. Those 
who have served the revolution have plowed the sea.”22 The conflicts of Liberals and 
Conservatives during this time would be less about ideology and class struggle and focus more 
on the intraclass struggle between the elite and those that had aspirations of being part of the 
elite.23 
In February of 1821 rebellion began in Mexico, and news of these events quickly spread 
to the south.  The ideas of local participation and decision making had become part of the fabric 
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of the local ayuntamientos (municipal councils), and each of them took it upon themselves to 
decide how they should respond to the battle for independence going on in Mexico. In a stormy 
session held in Guatemala, the majority of the delegates (including most of the moderates led by 
José del Valle) voted in favor of independence. In practice, the vote changed absolutely nothing. 
Though the more conservative aspects of Spanish bureaucracy remained in control the creole 
elite had taken control of their own destiny, and reacted against the Spanish liberal regime. The 
Conservative Party can trace its origins to this meeting of elites as they united in their pursuit of 
both independence from Spain and an adherence to the methods of the Spanish crown. 
Perhaps arrogantly, the decision that was finally reached in Guatemala for independence 
was considered applicable to the entire region of Central America. Once again, however, the idea 
of local participation and control would be apparent. In Nicaragua, the more conservative leaders 
in Granada declared their support for the central government in Guatemala and independence. In 
León, however, the elites declared independence from both Spain and Guatemala.24 The elites of 
León were, however, willing to support uniting with Mexico. Though arguably most pronounced 
in the rival cities of Granada and León, a similar fragmentation of opinion occurred throughout 
Central America. In San Salvador, the liberal leadership of Father José Matías Delgado decided 
to declare the independence of El Salvador, requiring those that wished to be part of a Mexican 
or Guatemalan confederation to leave the city. Other cities in the region responded differently, 
leading to further conflict. In Honduras, Tegucigalpa sided with the conservative leadership in 
Guatemala while the city of Comayagua followed the lead of Padre Delgado in declaring 
complete independence. The last of the eventual provinces, Costa Rica, had no less than four 
cities vying for primacy in 1821. 
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The initial issue dividing the region became the concern of annexation to the newly 
independent Mexican Empire. Conservatives throughout Central America supported the 
Guatemalan government and annexation to Mexico while liberal contingents favored an 
independent republic for Central America. The conservatives had the advantage over their 
opposition as they maintained control of the various levers of government, thwarting liberal 
efforts. As might be expected, this led to further violence throughout the region, including 
Guatemala, Nicaragua, and El Salvador. The violence proved insufficient to sway the issue, and 
by the end of 1821 the majority of the ayuntamientos had chosen to support annexation. Only 
San Salvador and Granada rejected annexation outright, exhibiting an odd connection between 
liberal and conservative municipalities. San Salvador was invaded by troops from Mexico, and 
their military influence proved decisive (despite efforts to declare annexation to the United 
States).25 Granada, however, continued to hold out to pressure to join the annexation movement. 
The issue proved to be moot, as the Mexican empire envisioned by Agustín de Iturbide failed to 
survive even a year. After its collapse a new Central American congress formed on June 24, 
1823, bearing a decidedly more liberal mien. Many of the conservative politicians remained in 
Mexico, and their fortunes had fallen due to the collapse into anarchy of the Mexican 
government.  
The liberal leader of San Salvador, Padre Delgado, presided as the congress declared 
Central America free and independent on July 1, 1823. The congress adopted the name 
Provincias Unidas del Centro América or United Provinces of Central America, and the next day 
convened a National Constituent Assembly with the end goal of writing a constitution for the 
new republic. Mexico recognized the United Provinces, and its military forces returned to 
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Mexico. The congress expressed a considerable and misplaced optimism for the future of this 
union. Though many of them blamed Spanish and Mexican partisans, serious economic and 
social divisions still plagued the newly born republic, and these divisions were not erased by the 
1824 constitution. The divisions remained primarily amongst the elites, as evidenced in 
Nicaragua, where an estimated 84% of the population was ladino (mestizo and mulatto) and 
outside of the elite power structure. Despite their numbers, these masses were left outside of the 
political debates.26 The issues that divided liberals and conservatives in the new union were not 
significantly different from those that existed under Spanish rule. The conservatives expressed a 
greater comfort level with monarchical rule, while the liberal contingent preferred a republican 
form of government. Conservatives believed that governing should be reserved for those who 
were properly educated and, equally importantly, held property and position in society – similar 
to that of Don Joaquín Fernández Vijil. Liberal political leaders endeavored, in contrast, to break 
down the monopolistic control of the economy and to eliminate the fueros (privileges) of the 
conservative elites (ecclesiastical, commercial, university). Both sides recognized the need for 
modernization and envisioned Central America as a strong international power, drawing from the 
utilitarian views of Jeremy Bentham when articulating their ideology.27 Despite this, and despite 
significant connections between the elite families of Central America, differing economic and 
political views divided the union at the local level. In the early years of the new republic, these 
views would focus the nascent parties into warring forces. These conflicting forces would 
continue to dominate Central America for the entirety of the nineteenth century and would be 
particularly apparent in the Nicaraguan cities of Granada and León. 
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The National Constituent Assembly initially served as an organ of power for the Liberal 
politicians, and acted quickly to eliminate the traditional class privileges. The Assembly 
abolished all titles of nobility, including the use of the honorific title don. This prohibition was 
extended to the Church as well, eliminating use of any term save that of padre.28 Despite violent 
uprisings, liberal Salvadoran troops arrived in Guatemala to support the burgeoning government. 
In November of 1824, the conservative and the liberal alliances established a compromise 
constitution. This constitution was heavily influenced by both the Spanish Constitution of 1812 
as well as the United States Constitution of 1789. The constitution established five autonomous 
states with their respective assemblies, judiciaries, and executives. Liberal leader Manuel José de 
Arce maneuvered in the Congress to win the first election for president of Central America. Arce 
attempted to establish a coalition with conservative politicians, unintentionally creating 
resentment amongst the more extreme liberals. The lack of federal control was clear early, and 
Arce never maintained control of the five constituent provinces. Once again, Nicaragua provided 
a prime example of violent disagreement between liberal and conservative factions. President 
Arce personally led military forces in an effort to pacify the conflicting forces in Nicaragua. He 
succeeded only in creating a momentary armistice and lull in the conflict between  Granada and 
León.29 The conflicts in Nicaragua were mild compared to the conflicts that would be faced by 
Arce’s government in the early years. The radical liberals that felt betrayed by Arce rallied and 
opposed the government, forcing Arce to unite with conservative Mariano Aycinena. In 
Honduras, General Francisco Morazán rallied forces and emerged as a Liberal military leader. 
Arce resigned from the presidency, leaving Aycinena as the power behind the Central American 
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government. Morazán’s forces engaged in a civil war from 1826-1829, showcasing the violent 
differences in viewpoint in the isthmus.  
Morazán’s victory led to persecution of conservative leaders and the introduction of 
legislation by radical liberal politicians. Elections were held again at the end of 1830, and 
Morazán was named to the presidency. Despite his successful role in the civil war and the 
removal of many conservative political leaders, Morazán’s popularity was not universal. 
Moderate José del Valle won the 1834 election, in a triumph for those favoring moderation of the 
liberal policies coming from the Morazán government. Those evincing moderate political views 
were likely disappointed by the death of del Valle, leading Morazán to retain the presidency (as 
he had received the second highest number of votes in the election). With the death of their 
leader, many moderates felt unable to effect change and began to join with conservatives in 
opposition to the liberal government. The bitterness and frustration turned increasingly more 
violent as time passed without change in the liberal agenda. 
The political realities of Nicaragua mirrored those of the remainder of the isthmus. 
Following the military intervention by Arce, the State Constituent Assembly installed Manuel 
Antonio de la Cerda as the new chief of state for Nicaragua in April of 1825, with Juan Argüello 
as the vice-chief. The relationship between Argüello and de la Cerda was tumultuous, with 
Argüello taking power upon de la Cerda’s resignation a few months later. The resignation did not 
end the anarchic nature of Nicaraguan politics, and civil war was the order of the day there as 
was the case further to the north. This bitter civil war ended only with the public execution of de 
la Cerda near the end of 1828.30 
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During this time, Vijil had completed his education in León, graduating from the 
University of Leon on November 28, 1826. While in León, Vijil came into contact with a 
number of political actors, including Juan Argüello and de la Cerda.31 Importantly, he would also 
come into contact with the future Nicaraguan general Trinidad Muñoz.32 Vijil began his first 
career as a lawyer in Nicaragua, returning to his home city of Granada. His newfound liberal 
political outlook troubled his father, Don Joaquín. In 1829, Narciso Arellano resigned the post of 
General Minister for Nicaragua. Arguello remembered Vijil, and offered the position to him 
directly.33 Francisco Morazán sought to consolidate his control by sending the Honduran 
Dionisio Herrera to León as the federal governor in an attempt to pacify the violence, organize 
the state, and establish Liberal ascendancy in the area. Herrera was in no hurry to arrive in 
Nicaragua, and quickly named Juan Espinoza as his representative there. Espinoza in turn 
appointed Vijil to the same position.34 The arrival of Herrera was seen as a potential boon by 
Vijil and others, desperate for an end to the continued war that had torn the nation apart since 
independence from Spain. Herrera’s reluctance to travel to Nicaragua caused Vijil to write a 
telling letter to the federal government in Guatemala: 
Minister General of  Guatemala 
My Government regrets to inform you of the new misfortunes that threaten unhappy 
Nicaragua: Managua, with its tenacious dissidence wishes to make the first days of our 
peace bitter. You are aware, Citizen Secretary, of the efforts that the Government has 
used to allow Managua the enjoyment of immense benefits. 
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Four residents of that town, or better say a small theocratic faction, imbued with insane 
ideologies, despised the people’s entreaties of union and peace. What are my resources to 
look into this situation, and when does this leniency become a discredit to the other towns 
of the state? 
My Government that has tried to avoid destructive recourses or weapons to end the 
difficult business. I reiterate, I beg for the elected chief, Citizen Dionisio Herrera, to 
accelerate his march to this State, let his journey have a successful conclusion. Only the 
presence of Señor Herrera could bring the benefits of peace and harmony to Nicaragua; 
but this means has been fruitless because the man has begged off his blessed march for so 
long. 
Finally, Minister, it was agreed by the Legislature to circumvent Managua militarily for 
fear and total lack of provisions once surrender is achieved, and my Government is 
looking into the slim hope of implementing the sovereign order. 
Heaven grant that without the fatal effects of war the expressed reconciliation that just 
demands be achieved. 
My government has instructed me to inform him of the situation as soon as he arrives. I 
offer you my most respectful consideration and appreciation. 
Dios, Unión, Libertad – Granada, April 5, 1830 
Agustín Vijil35 
The concern evinced by Vijil for his home of Nicaragua is evident in this letter to the Federal 
Government in Guatemala. At this point in his career, his service as a lawyer and politician 
dominate his thinking and would, of course, continue to influence him upon ordination. His wish 
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for a consummation of hostilities represented an honest interest in peace, but not in peace at any 
cost. The beliefs he acquired while at university dominated his thinking, and would be important 
to his future role in Nicaraguan history. 
Dionisio Herrera had previously been the Honduran head of state, removed from office 
by conservatives in Honduras and imprisoned in Guatemala until the end of the Central 
American civil war. Despite his checkered past, Vijil looked to Herrera as a savior for the 
province of Nicaragua. As noted, Vijil sided with the liberal contingent in the civil war and 
believed that Herrera would establish liberal supremacy in the beleaguered province. Not only 
would this be a victory for Vijil’s political views it would accomplish a more important goal, 
peace and prosperity for Nicaragua. Even at this point, he was focused on trying to create a 
longer term solution to the political issues that had engendered the years of anarchy in his home.  
Herrera would finally arrive in Nicaragua in April, 1830 upon which he announced, “I 
have been sent to you by the Supreme Federal Government to conciliate your quarrels, to pacify 
the State, to organize it, to reestablish order and the government of law, to end your misfortunes, 
and to stop civil war, the cause of all your troubles.”36 This agenda proved to be an impossible 
one for the politician to achieve. Herrera was an astute enough leader and executive to ameliorate 
the political differences, but it proved impossible to eliminate the armed conflict. 1831 was a 
year of relative peace, but violence once again surfaced. In 1833, La Opinion Pública denounced 
the resurgence of civil war as “the monster that attacks and devours” and “contradictory to the 
teaching of our Holy Religion.”37 Herrera’s primary accomplishment during his three years in 
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Nicaragua was not a legacy of peace (as Vijil would have wished), but rather liberal political 
dominance from León for nearly a decade and a half, from 1830-1845.38 
The 1830s highlighted the difficulties faced by Central America as it strove to achieve 
independence as a unified nation. The economic policies of the liberal elite severely damaged 
native industries in efforts to enhance international trade, and taxation policies led to campesino, 
or peasant, unrest throughout Central America. This unrest created an undercurrent of social 
conflict between peasants and elite. This conflict did not depend on conservative or liberal 
governments – primarily on which of them held power, as both parties cared little for the plight 
of the underclass. In Nicaragua, this conflict was expressed in terms of desnudos (the naked) 
against mechudos (the longhairs) and caused rebellions in Nicaragua that would continue through 
to the Guerra de las Communidades (War of the Communities) in 1881.39 For the next decades, 
such strife would not be uncommon, though it would rarely influence the policies of the reigning 
elites. Private and communal lands were ceded to foreign interests during this time, with some 
properties netting the government as much as 253,526 pesos.40 Opposition was further 
engendered by the new liberal judicial system. Liberals considered the system of laws unjust and 
antiquated, and determined to replace them with the adoption of the Edward Livingston Codes 
on January 1, 1837. Originally based on the Napoleonic Code, these laws had been originally 
introduced by Edward Livingston for use in the Louisiana territory in 1824.41 The majority of the 
population considered the codes less of an attempt to establish social justice than a centralization 
of authority from Guatemala City – a centralization that promised further foreign influences as 
well as continued anti-clericalism. The cholera epidemic of 1837 transformed the grievances, 
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both threatened and real, into full rebellion.42 The Guatemalan priests fanned concerns over the 
government handling of the epidemic by telling the campesinos that the medicine being put into 
the water was actually poison, leading to further panic and insurgency.43  
The years after the Herrera departed in 1833 were difficult for Vijil as a liberal in the 
conservative city of Granada. Conservative politicians worked against Vijil and his political 
allies. Many liberals were suspicious of him due to his role in the federal government, as distrust 
of Guatemala was always high. Four of his associates were imprisoned, though Vijil himself 
escaped capture.44 He sought refuge at his family’s finca in Granada, and eventually was 
pardoned by the government through his own liberal connections and through the intervention of 
his mother on his behalf.45 This intervention saved him from prison, but his mother would exact 
a cost upon her son. She had determined that her son should join the priesthood, a fate that the 
young man seems to have accepted. Vijil traveled to Cartegana in New Granada to comply with 
the wishes of his mother in 1835. His knowledge of canonical law and Latin made his studies 
relatively brief, and Vijil was ordained on April 16, 1836.46 Upon his return, he served in the 
Granadan diocese until 1839. 
As the Central American federal union collapsed, León and the liberals moved to 
establish Nicaragua as an independent nation. On April 30, 1838 a constituent assembly declared 
Nicaragua to be a free and sovereign state. Unlike many political issues, independence was 
supported both by León and Granada, liberals and conservatives alike.47 The intention of the 
Constitution of 1838 was to establish a civilian and republican government focused on providing 
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liberties for the citizens of Nicaragua. The Constitution of 1838 was important for numerous 
reasons, not the least of which was in distinguishing the Liberals from the Conservatives. The 
struggles of the next twenty years would be focused on Liberal efforts to support the new 
constitution and Conservative efforts to eliminate it.48 
 
An Independent Nicaragua 
 
 The Constitution of 1838 separated the powers of the various branches of government. 
The legislature was strengthened, while the executive was weakened proportionally. The military 
command was separated as much as possible from the executive branch. The Nicaraguan chief 
executive, designated the supreme director, was limited to only a two year term. The role quickly 
proved to be contentious. For the next several years, five successive legislators held the 
executive office. It was not until the elections of 1841 that Pablo Buitrago of León was chosen as 
the first supreme director of Nicaragua that the executive branch was separate from legislative 
control. Independence and a new constitution proved no cure for the violent conflict that had 
begun before 1838. Despite this, the Liberal party maintained nominal control for a number of 
years. In 1844, a particularly vicious civil war concluded with the sacking of León in January of 
1845. León and Nicaragua had joined in the wider isthmian conflict, and in the 1840s the 
political winds had shifted towards the Conservatives. In the mid-nineteenth century, Nicaragua 
would suffer more civil wars than any other Central American state.49 
 By the mid-1840s, Nicaragua was the only Liberal government in Central America.50 
General Francisco Malespín, Conservative leaver of El Salvador, allied himself with Hondurans 
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to invade Nicaragua. Their stated goal was to take captive exiles who had supported the erstwhile 
Central American president Francisco Morazán.51 The rival city of Granada, as might be 
imagined, saw these events as a chance to attain dominance over León. Granada joined with the 
forces of Managua and Rivas to set up a provisional government. Instead of removing the foreign 
invaders, the new Nicaraguan government sent its military forces to join with those of El 
Salvador and Honduras. The resultant siege ended in the destruction of León. With outside help, 
Granada had successfully thwarted its rival city and ended the dominance the Liberals had held 
since Herrera took power.52 
 The beginning of 1845, unsurprisingly, saw the first Conservative supreme director of 
Nicaragua, José León Sandoval. The Conservative party faced further weaking when prominent 
Liberal general José Trinidad Muñoz decided to desert the Liberal cause and support the 
Conservatives, following the winds of power.53 Like all occupants of high political office in 
Nicaragua, Sandoval was solidly a member of the elites both politically and economically, his 
enterprises combining shipping concerns on the San Juan river as well as agricultural concerns. 
The Conservative vision of the future that Sandoval supported differed minimally from that 
presented by the Liberal leaders of León. The primary difference was his place of residence. That 
difference, in the Nicaragua of the nineteenth century, meant everything. In fact, Sandoval did no 
better than his Liberal opponents at restoring order to Nicaragua. Norberto Ramírez noted this 
political concern when speaking as president of the Legislative Assembly in 1846, “The absence 
of national order and the false pleasures of exaggerated freedom have broken all the threads of 
the fabric of unity, even within families, and have produced the most complete and disastrous 
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anarchy. Each wants to enjoy a liberty without restrictions; none wants to obey the law or the 
authorities; and each wants to be the tyrant over the others. This behavior will destroy 
everything.”54 
 The Conservatives, like the Liberals, began to realize the difficulties in governing 
Nicaragua. One of the first actions proved to be exceedingly controversial – Sandoval moved the 
capital of Nicaragua from León to Granada. In fairness, León had been severely damaged during 
the most recent civil war. The Leonese nonetheless disapproved of this move. In one of the few 
instances of compromise during this period, politicians determined that the capital should be 
established between Granada and León – leading to the village of Managua being raised to the 
status of a city which would eventually become the new capital of Nicaragua in 1852, ending at 
least one of the conflicts between León and Granada.55 
 The conflict over the Constitution of 1838 remained, however. Sandoval brought the 
constituent assembly together in order to draft a new constitution for Nicaragua, but the 
Constitution of 1848 was not completed during his term in office. His successor, José Guerrero, 
veered more liberal than conservative and decided to allow the controversies over a new 
constitution to fall away. José Laureano Pineda took power back for the Conservative party in 
1851, though the election of 1853 would prove more momentous for Nicaraguan politics. 
Twenty-six candidates were in the running for the position of supreme director (although only 
five received a significant number of votes). The wide field of candidates prevented either the 
Liberal candidate from León, Francisco Castellón or the Conservative from Granada, Fruto 
Chamorro, from gaining victory. This threw the election to the legislature, and it chose to 
transfer power to Chamorro. Despite the closeness of the election, most Nicaraguans believed 
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this to be a definitive victory of Granada over the Liberal city of León. Upon his inauguration, he 
promised to cure what he saw as the primary ill of Nicaraguan society, stating “I understand that 
my foremost duty is to maintain order, as this is the primary objective of society and the only 
way it can assure the happiness and prosperity of its citizens, I will try with the power you have 
placed in my hands to fulfill that duty, to fulfill it in such a way that the Nicaraguan people will 
not suffer the harm caused by the disturbance of order. I will follow the wise rule of law that 
prescribes preventing the crime rather than the curing of it.”56 Liberals read these promises to 
hold forth the greater subjugation of León and the aggrandizement of Granada.  
 On May 1853, Chamorro took steps that caused Liberals to believe they were correct 
about his intentions. He called on the Conservative controlled legislature to pass a law calling for 
the formation of a new constituent assembly to create a new constitution, envisioning replacing 
the contentious 1838 document. Once again, his primary concern was the establishment of order 
and he followed a line of reasoning that ascribed the lack of order to the lack of a strong 
executive. Thus, the constitution envisioned by Chamorro would offer greater powers and 
capabilities to the supreme director. Tensions increased over this political standoff, and in 
November Chamorro increased the potential for conflict by announcing a “secret plot” amongst 
Liberals to overthrow his government. In an attempt to make good on his promise to maintain 
order, Chamorro ordered the arrest of the Liberal leaders (including those that had been named to 
the upcoming constituent assembly). Most of them successfully fled to Honduras before facing 
capture. “Insurrection is rebellion; it is an unjustifiable crime that the supreme law of social 
cohesion condemns” announced Chamorro, in defense of his policies. 57  Tensions had once 
again been exacerbated, and Nicaragua once again faced the specter of civil war. This war would 
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prove to be unlike any that had come before, and would threaten Nicaraguan sovereignty in an 
entirely different manner. 
 
Central America, Nicaragua, and the Catholic Church 
 
 The institution of the Catholic Church has been vitally important to Latin America since 
the arrival of the Spanish in the sixteenth century. Catholic priests arrived in Nicaragua almost as 
quickly, with the arrival of Padre Diego de Agüero in 1523. In colonial Latin America, the 
Catholic Church provided an underpinning of support and legitimization for the conquest. The 
famous rationale for travel to the New World was God, gold, and glory. While gold was often in 
short supply and glory a debatable term, the Spanish conquerors certainly brought God along 
with them. As might be expected, the Church was initially a strong supporter of colonial 
monarchical rule from Spain. That support would not be universal in the decades to come. Social 
and political conflicts in the New World and beyond would find themselves reflected in the 
Catholic Church. The institution itself would be primarily Conservative in its politics, but that 
did not prevent clergy from identifying with Liberal causes and political ideals. One such priest, 
of course, would be Padre Vijil, and Conservative and Liberal ideologies would find significant 
support among the ecclesiastical representatives in Central America. This initial division was 
evident in Nicaragua as early as 1543. Antonio de Valdivieso, a Dominican, was appointed 
bishop of León. Bishop Valdivieso championed the indigenous population of Nicaragua, 
bringing him in direct conflict with the political authorities of the time as he spoke out against 
indigenous slavery.58 This opposition did not end well for him; forces loyal to the governor 
assassinated Bishop Valdivieso and looted the city of León.59  
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The Nicaraguan Church followed the rest of Central American in divisions over the 
political issues surrounding independence in Latin America. The ranking Catholic clergy sided 
with Spain in the beginning of the nineteenth century, while the priests more closely connected 
with the masses served as active participants in the independence movement. Padres José 
Antonio Moñino and Benito Miguelena both supported Leonese rebellions against Spanish 
authority from 1811 to 1813. In December of 1811, Padre Miguelena wrote a letter on behalf of 
the rebels to the bishop of León, Nicolás García Jerez. At least temporarily, the bishop acceded 
to their demands. The clergy supporting revolution suffered with the other rebels as the Spanish 
government crushed the nascent rebellion, and imprisoned the clergy that chose to aid the rebels. 
The clerical divisions inherent in Nicaraguan society provide additional context to the incident 
that would help exacerbate the rivalry between the León and Granada. In 1812, the vicar of 
Granada, José Antonio Chamorro, issued a proclamation against the  popular revolt. His words 
went beyond simple opposition, forcefully accusing the rebels of treason against God and the 
Church as well as their rightful King: “Therefore, the people conceive that they have more power 
than God, the Church, and the King. We can conclude that the insurgents are traitors to God, to 
the religion, and to the King of the country.”60 Those clergy that participated in the rebellion 
received prison sentences for their efforts; it was, of course, dangerous to act against the properly 
constituted Church authorities. The Catholic Church remained an important part of Central 
America life following independence as the Constitution of 1824 declared it the official religion 
of Central America. 
Liberal opposition to Church policies reinforced the church’s conservative leanings. 
Lowell Gudmundson noted this as the primary feature defining Liberalism in Central America 
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prior to 1860: violent opposition to the Church as it affected social and political policy in the 
isthmus.61 Gudmundson further pointed out that many priests, especially in the provinces, were 
supporters of Liberal policies. The Church faced significant political challenges from Liberal 
forces (and Conservative opportunists) determined to limit the power of religious authorities. 
Under the leadership of Francisco Morazán, the regular orders (particularly the Dominicans) 
found themselves expelled from Central America under a decree on July 28, 1829. A total of 289 
clerics were exiled, and their property seized. The wealth and privilege of the Church became a 
popular target of Liberal political figures.62 The political struggles surrounding the Church found 
polarization in the same Liberal-Conservative dichotomy that promulgated chaos and anarchy 
through Central America from 1823 to 1857. Liberals traditionally advocated for reducing 
restrictions on trade and commerce, and eliminating exemptions for the Catholic Church. 
Conservatives, as might be imagined, supported maintaining the status quo as much as possible. 
In Nicaragua, these political divisions focused (as always) on the cities of León and Granada.63 
The Nicaraguan Constitution of 1838 continued the Liberal political trend, allowing for the 
exercise of religion other than Catholicism in Nicaragua. This formed part of the Conservative 
opposition to the Constitution of 1838, and was part of the opposition presented by Chamorro 
when he called for a revised constitution in the 1850s.64 
Despite the political chaos, the Church in Nicaragua spent the decades after independence 
eschewing direct political issues. José Desiderio de la Quedra served as Bishop of Nicaragua 
from 1825 to his death in 1849, and was praised for the neutrality he advocated. He had been 
educated in León, and rose from a family of modest means. His successor, Pedro Solís, 
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continued that policy until his death in 1852. In 1852, the policy of political neutrality was 
reversed by Pope Pius IX’s choice as bishop, Jorge de Viteri. Bishop Viteri had previously 
served as the Bishop of El Salvador, and his political adventurism had led to his expulsion from 
El Salvador. An associate of his (and confidante to the United States consul) Manuel Francisco 
Pavón had warned Viteri against involvement in the turbulent political climate of Nicaragua, but 
such warnings proved unnecessary as Bishop Viteri passed away in 1853.65 The chaos of the 
Nicaraguan Civil War prevented another bishop from being consecrated in Nicaragua until 1859. 
During that period, the institution of the Church found itself unable to provide guidance or 
stability to the beleaguered Central American nation. The direction of the Church was left to 
local priests, and their leadership was also divided in response to William Walker’s intervention 
in the middle of the 1850s. 
When Agustín Vijil returned to Nicaragua following his ordination in 1836, he was 
assigned by Bishop de la Quedra to the parish of San Fernando Masaya. He remained in Masaya 
until 1843, at which time he returned to Granada. Vijil removed himself from political activity, 
but many in the Conservative stronghold had memories of his earlier Liberal activity. In 1843, 
the Church removed Vijil from Granada in order to avoid hostilities both with the elites as well 
as other priests in the area.66 Despite this, Vijil had supporters in Granada that were impressed by 
his eloquence and knowledge, and those individuals took to writing letters to the ecclesiastical 
authorities seeking a redress of grievances for Vijil. These pleas came to fruition on June 20 of 
1850, at which time he was appointed priest of Granada and Vicar of the Department of the 
East.67 He served creditably in this role for the next several years, until Fruto Chamorro came to 
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power in 1853. The Conservative government resented the presence of the Liberal clergy, 
especially given the long-standing alliance between the Conservatives and the Catholic Church. 
Most reports indicate that Padre Vijil attempted to stay out of political disputes, but he would 
often feel obligated to preserve and protect the lower classes under his care. Discussions between 
Chamorro and Vijil would be heard by numerous people in the squares, with Vijil’s requests 
often being ignored by the Conservative president.68 His political voice would be muted until the 
arrival of William Walker in Granada. 
 
England, the United States, and the Trans-isthmian Canal 
International attention continued to be focused on Nicaragua due to the potential of a 
canal allowing direct access from the Atlantic to the Pacific. Vijil, as with many Nicaraguans, 
believed that this attention would be the key to improving life in their nation. The United States 
and England engaged in a heated competition to acquire the right to create a canal in this 
location. Understanding the events that would follow involves examining these interests. The 
instructions from Secretary of State John M. Clayton  to Ephraim George Squier in Nicaragua 
indicated the grandiose expectations presented in the process of building a canal across the 
Nicaraguan portion of the Central American isthmus in 1850: 
Regarding the completion of that enterprise which had heretofore engaged the attention 
of philanthropists and statesmen for three hundred years without effect… tell the 
members of the Company who have with the aid of the United States obtained the power 
to construct this work that if there be any mean spirit of speculation indulged in by them, 
or any of them, to blight or disgrace so glorious an undertaking, they will merit and 
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receive the execrations of good men, while on the other hand, if they be true to their own 
honor, their own interests and the best interests of their own country and of the human 
race , their names will be handed down to posterity among those of the noblest 
benefactors of man.69 
 
Since the beginning of the nineteenth century, the United States had designs on expansion and 
exploitation of Central America.70 In addition to territorial expansion, there existed significant 
interest in establishing an interoceanic route. The man who would one day be Napoleon III, 
Emperor of France, had in 1846 remarked upon the potential of that route: 
The State of Nicaragua can become better than Constantinople, the necessary route of the 
great commerce of the world, and is destined to attain an extraordinary degree of 
prosperity and grandeur. France, England, and Holland have a great commercial interest 
in the establishment of a communication between the two oceans, but England has, more 
than other powers, a political interest in the execution of this project.71 
 
While Nicaragua was undergoing significant political strife, the powers of Britain and the United 
States were imagining the opportunities inherent for themselves in the potential commercial 
bounty of Nicaragua. 
 Interest by the United States was significantly enhanced by the California gold rush of 
1848-1849, directing U.S interest heavily on this trans-isthmian canal.72 This passage was so 
important to U.S. interests that the two potential routes in Nicaragua and Panama received the 
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most sizable level of foreign investment by U.S. citizens prior to the United States Civil War.73 
The discovery of gold along with the settlement of the California and Oregon territories created 
an amazing level of demand for a route other than the vast trek across land in the United States 
or the long and perilous Cape Horn journey. The most popular potential route was the crossing in 
Panama (then still a part of Colombia) – from Chagres on the Caribbean coast to Panama City on 
the Pacific coast. Though Panama had no canal at this point, a series of steamships on the 
Atlantic and Pacific sides made use of this narrow overland route in the 1840s. The Chagres side 
was served by the United States Mail Steamship Company; the Panama City to San Francisco, 
CA, route was covered by the Pacific Mail Steamship Company. Although this route had a 
number of advantages, the overland trip across Panama was both difficult and dangerous. 
Remaining in the disease ridden port of Chagres overnight was considered dangerous enough 
that insurance companies included a cancellation clause in their policies for just that event.74 
 The Nicaraguan route was initially not more inviting than the Panamanian route, but the 
difficulties of Panamanian transit and the complicity of the Nicaraguan government would make 
the more northern route an attractive option. Travel on the Nicaraguan route was complicated by 
both the greater length and the varied steps required to make the crossing. Passengers would 
disembark at the Atlantic port town of San Juan del Norte and travel via canoe up the San Juan 
River to Lake Nicaragua. A series of river rapids would force disembarking a minimum of three 
times prior to  arrival at the lake. The lake itself could have issues, as early travelers reported 
encountering sharks and inclement weather events on the trek.75 The last section of the journey 
involved carts pulled by either oxen or mules – a particularly difficult journey during the 
                                                 
73 Wilkins 1970, 28. 
74 Folkman 1972, 2. 
75 Stout 1859, 19. 
39 
 
quagmire that was the rainy season in Nicaragua. The difficulties inherent in this journey led to 
the desire for a canal that would permit transit to the Pacific without disembarking. In Nicaragua, 
planners expected that such a canal would employ the San Juan River and Lake Nicaragua. The 
dream of creating such a route entailed considerable challenges concerning technology and 
financing. British interest in creating a similar canal caused another issue with the construction. 
 The British interest in Nicaragua and Central America in general can be traced to one 
man, Frederick Chatfield, who had arrived in Central America from Britain in 1834. For nearly 
the next two decades, Chatfield provided the dominant foreign interest in the region. His 
influence was notable and nettlesome enough to cause a Salvadoran newspaper to refer to him as 
“a living curse which corrodes the vitals of Central America.”76 Despite his lack of popularity, 
Chatfield proved effective in the region. Lord Palmerston, the British Foreign Secretary for much 
of Chatfield’s time in the area, supported of his efforts. The British government allowed 
Chatfield virtual free reign to establish British policy in Central America. Palmerston directed 
the Royal Navy to make a show of force at Chatfield’s behest in order “to protect British 
nationals from interference in their commercial exploits.”77 Chatfield envisioned British control 
over a Central American isthmus through control of the Mosquito Territory on the Eastern coast 
of Nicaragua. His plans included control of San Juan del Norte, one of the primary ports for a 
planned canal. In 1848, the British occupation of the Mosquito Coast expanded to allow for 
British control of any canal interest.78 Jeremy Bentham sent an early plan for a canal to the 
Guatemalan ambassador residing in Britain at the time, José María del Barrio. Bentham also 
provided this plan to the British Foreign Secretary at the time, George Canning. The plan 
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strongly implied the threat of potential French involvement. Bentham reinforced the desirability 
of the location, and noted in his papers that “Lake Nicaragua affords a most promising spot for 
the junction, and is far superior to any other.”79 
 The United States, citing the Monroe Doctrine, expressed an understandable degree of 
concern over the increasing British activity in Central America. During the War with Mexico, 
President James K. Polk dispatched Elijah Hise to Guatemala with instructions to do what he 
could to further a unified Central American state that could provide a degree of resistance to 
British influence in the region. The internecine conflict and violence throughout Central America 
would, of course, make that goal untenable. Polk’s additional directives to Hise were more 
achievable, as he was to report on British involvement in the area and negotiate treaties of 
friendship and trade with the independent Central American states.80 Chatfield sent a message to 
Palmerston noting that “It will, I think, be necessary to take a high hand with the North 
Americans, if we are to hold our ground in Central America.” Palmerston replied that Chatfield 
was to oppose the aims of the United States “as far as its object is hostile to the interests of Great 
Britain.”81 Chatfield’s personal secretary was Manuel F Pavón, one of José Rafael Carrera’s 
leading advisers. Specifically, Chatfield and Pavón sought to support British interests by 
maintaining Conservative sovereign states in Central America.82 Hise apparently felt a necessity 
to stymie British efforts in Nicaragua by finalizing a treaty with that nation. Despite lacking 
formal approval, Hise signed the Hise-Silva Treaty on May 31, 1849. The treaty allowed for 
rights of transit via canal, road, or railroad in perpetuity as well as guaranteeing the integrity and 
independence of Nicaragua.  
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 Polk’s successor, President Zachary Taylor, proved uninterested in the Hise treaty, 
replacing Hise with Ephraim George Squier on June 6, 1849. Squier focused on determining 
whether British or United States interests would hold sway in the area. Secretary of State John 
M. Clayton instructed Squier to aid in acquiring a canal contract for United States capitalists 
interested in Nicaraguan investment, specifically one approved by the Nicaraguan government.83 
Squier was not authorized to guarantee the independence of the territory of Nicaragua. The canal 
goal was ostensibly to allow for equal access for all per Clayton’s instructions: “Our object is as 
honest as it is clearly avowed, to claim no peculiar privilege, no exclusive right, no monopoly of 
commercial intercourse, but to see that the work is dedicated to the benefit of mankind.”84  
 Nicaraguans were, on the whole, eager to support a treaty that would bring the dream of a 
Nicaraguan canal to fruition. This was a dream especially pursued and supported by the Liberals 
in power, as they evinced a particular appreciation for United States intervention (moreso than 
that of Britain). In later years, John H. Wheeler noted that Agustín Vijil had “expressed much 
desire that the United States should own Nicaragua and prevent their sanguinary revolutions.”85 
The Nicaraguan government certainly desired the economic advantages that would be accessed 
by having the primary transit route in the Western Hemisphere. The primary concern of 
Nicaraguans was that the transit should benefit Nicaragua and not solely foreign entrepreneurs or 
governments. This environment provided an opening for United States businessman Cornelius 
Vanderbilt.  
Along with Joseph L. White and Nathaniel H. Wolfe, Vanderbilt formed the American 
Atlantic and the Pacific Ship Canal Company. The Nicaraguan government signed a contract 
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allowing the newly formed corporation exclusive access to the construction of a canal in 
Nicaragua. Under this agreement, the canal was to be open to all. Initially, Nicaragua would 
benefit from a payment of $10,000 along with a similar sum annually until the canal was 
completed. Nicaragua was also to receive $200,000 worth of stock in the enterprise and ten 
percent of the net profits for any route established by Vanderbilt’s corporation.86  
 During this time, Squier worked to establish means to protect treaty negotiations for the 
United States. In order to accomplish this, he negotiated an interim treaty with Nicaragua as 
directed by the United States Department of State. Contrary to his instructions, he also conceded 
a guarantee of Nicaraguan independence. This infraction was part of the rationale behind 
rejection of the treaty by the United States Congress. Clayton also expressed concerns about the 
limited duration of the treaty (twenty years) and the inclusion of a clause that allowed for the 
annulment of the treaty by either party with twelve month’s notice. In rejecting the treaty, 
Clayton noted that further instructions would be transmitted once they had negotiated with the 
British to leave the Mosquito Territory.87 Clayton proceeded to negotiate directly with Britain in 
order to bring such issues to a close. He negotiated with the British Minister in Washington, 
D.C., Sir Henry Lytton Bulwer, to achieve a satisfactory agreement. Clayton was exceptionally 
proud of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty signed on April 19, 1850.88 His efforts focused on economic 
and commercial expansion in the region, though stopping short of imperialistic aspirations. In 
communications with Squier, Clayton expanded on the objectives of the treaty: 
The object is to secure the protection of the British Government to the Nicaragua Canal 
and to liberate Central America from the dominion of any foreign power… secure the 
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passage across the isthmus and every other practicable passage whether by Canal or 
Railway at Tehuantepec, Panama or elsewhere… All other nations that shall navigate the 
Canal will have to become guarantors of Central America and the Mosquito Coast… The 
agreement is not to erect or maintain any fortification commanding the canal or in the 
vicinity thereof nor to occupy, fortify, colonize or assume, or exercise any dominion 
whatever over any part of Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito Coast, or Central 
America, nor to make use of any protection or alliance for any of those purposes.89 
 
 With the establishment of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, the American Atlantic and Pacific 
Ship Canal Company made preliminary plans for carrying out their contract with Nicaragua. 
Vanderbilt and company proceeded to lay out plans and seek financing for the project, but soon 
ran into difficulties. Proposals to establish a canal capable of accommodating all vessels of the 
age ran as high as $100,000,000, a sum beyond what Vanderbilt had any hope of raising to 
establish the canal. Without stable sources of financing or the support of multiple governments, 
Vanderbilt was forced to abandon the project.90  
In lieu of a viable canal project, Vanderbilt turned his attention to establishing a short 
term land and water route that would, in the end, prove to be the only route. A new corporate 
entity was created to work in conjunction with the American Atlantic and Pacific Ship Canal 
Company – the Accessory Transit Company. The Accessory Transit Company was designated 
solely to providing transit for passengers across Nicaragua while plans for an eventual canal 
were being prepared. The demand for traffic along this route was impressive and introduced the 
Nicaraguan populace to hordes of United States citizens that were looking to travel to California. 
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The relative prosperity of these travelers helped convince Nicaraguans that international 
commerce had the potential to uplift their nation to the economic heights that had been predicted 
in the region for generations.91  
After creating this route, Cornelius Vanderbilt endeavored to divest himself of direct 
interest in the Accessory Transit Corporation in 1853, selling his shares to his colleagues Charles 
Morgan in New York and Cornelius K. Garrison in San Francisco. While Vanderbilt went on a 
planned vacation to Europe, Morgan and Garrison conspired to gain complete control of the 
Board of Directors. They determined that Vanderbilt was actually indebted to the company, and 
made no further payments to him on their contract. While they went about gaining the enmity of 
Vanderbilt, they also faced Nicaraguan concerns over the lack of profitability to their 
government.  
These negotiations were held as Nicaragua fell into yet another civil war, this one 
involving the arrival of a “gray-eyed man of destiny” from the United States. This foreign 
intervention would not come with government sponsorship but rather through private 
individuals. The situation in Nicaragua provided the opportunity for Walker. The culture 
prevalent in the United States prior to 1854 would prove equally important in encouraging 
Walker and his phalanx to proceed on their course. With this in mind, the next chapter will focus 
on the cultural factors in the United States that allowed for “filibustering” to flourish. 
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CHAPTER 3: BEHIND GREY EYES 
By the twenty-first century, the name of William Walker has been largely forgotten in the 
popular American consciousness. Prior to the United States Civil War, however, Walker’s 
exploits found a great deal of popular support. In examining the response to and effect on 
Nicaragua, it is equally important to understand the culture that allowed filibustering to prosper 
and precipitated the events of the 1850s. The origins of filibustering are in the twin American 
ideals of “Manifest Destiny” and “American Exceptionalism.” 
 
Nationalism and Manifest Destiny 
 In his work, Imagined Communities, Benedict Anderson defined a nation as an “imagined 
political community.”92 His examination of nationalism focused on the shared connection across 
groups of people bounded by time and space. Individuals that never physically met each other 
possessed a connection by virtue of being part of the same nation. Although Anderson focused 
on Europe and Asia in his study, his analysis is highly applicable to understanding the United 
States’ national fervor. It is especially relevant in the early nineteenth century, when the United 
States experienced excessive growth. Citizens of the United States saw their nation as a grand 
experiment, and it provided them with an extremely strong connection. Citizens of the United 
States were brought together by political ideals and loyalties as well as by a common culture and 
tradition.93 Another part of Anderson’s definition, however, did not directly apply to the United 
States’ nationalism of the era. He determined that a nation was also limited and possessed of a 
finite boundary. In the early nineteenth century, many did not acknowledge such limits as a part 
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of the United States definition of nationalism. Americans viewed the concept of Manifest 
Destiny as a driving force for the expansion of the nation, and often did not accept that there was 
a finite border to American expansion. 
 Three key themes exemplified Manifest Destiny in America. The first of these was a 
belief in the virtue of the American people and the institutions of their government. The concept 
of American Exceptionalism drew from this idea. Americans evinced a belief in their superiority, 
and assumed that their governance and systems were superior and deserving of expansion. This 
justified conquest and acquisition of additional territory, and led into the second theme: a 
mission to spread these American institutions, and establishing a world in the image of the 
United States. This calling had almost a missionary zeal to Americans. Finally, many viewed it 
as their destiny to spread these institutions.94 The propagation of American Exceptionalism was a 
directive supported by God. In his 1776 pamphlet, Common Sense, Thomas Paine stated that 
“We have it in our power to begin the world over again. A situation, similar to the present, hath 
not happened since the days of Noah until now. The birthday of a new world is at hand...”95 In 
these words, Paine exemplified the essential concepts of Manifest Destiny and American 
imperialism. 
One of the driving impulses of the beginning of the nineteenth century, the concept of 
Manifest Destiny influenced United States policy well in advance of the actual coining of the 
term. Filibustering was originally part of a larger design by such figures as Thomas Jefferson, 
James Madison, and James Monroe. These men were all focused on national expansion, with the 
caveat that they did not wish for the still young nation to embroil itself in wars.96 Very early 
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filibustering efforts in the Spanish territories of Florida followed this particular design. Tacit 
approval of such actions led to effective control of Eastern Florida by the United States, and 
eventually led to Spain ceding the territory to the Unites States.97 These actions proceeded 
carefully, avoiding direct conflict with the great powers. In line with this reasoning, the Congress 
passed the Neutrality Act of 1818. In essence the act noted that it was 
“Lawful for the President of the United States or such person as he shall have empowered 
for that purpose, to employ such part of the land or naval forces of the United States… 
for the purposes of preventing the carrying on of any such expedition or enterprise from 
the territories or jurisdiction of the United States against the territories or dominions of 
any foreign prince of state, or of any colony, district, or people with whom the United 
States are at peace.”98 
The wording of the act was important to future filibusters. It established that the basic concept of 
filibustering was illegal, and for many years efforts at filibustering were well contained. The 
United States urge towards Manifest Destiny was well satisfied in its  westward expansion with 
acquisitions such as the Louisiana Purchase. In the 1840s, American expansion reached the West 
coast. The war with Mexico in 1848 led to further acquisition, and presented a new frontier for 
United States expansion across the continent. 
 One additional aspect of Manifest Destiny and filibustering is important to acknowledge. 
In the years prior to the United States Civil War, the issue of slavery expansion colored the 
acquisition of territory. Many Southerners that filibustered did so in part to expand slavery. 
Walker himself did this, making Nicaragua the only Central American nation to reinstitute 
slavery. This garnered political advantage, with the newly added territories joining the United 
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States as slave states. Some envisioned an expansion of the United States from Mexico through 
Central America. Prior to the war, the Missouri Compromise and other varied legal compromises 
allowed only one avenue to strengthen the power of the slave states, expansion served that 
purpose. Indeed, after Walker’s last expedition the British found a projected constitution of the 
“Supreme Grand Lodge of the League of the Red Star of the United States.” The document 
demanded that those devoted to the cause of the of the South and her institutions would work to 
guard and perpetuate the institution of slavery. Despite the high-minded rhetoric, not all of the 
filibuster’s goals were by any means noble.99 
 
William Walker 
 Walker himself was a relatively unusual character and not one likely to be associated 
with revolutionary and filibustering intentions. He obtained a law degree by the age of fourteen 
from the University of Nashville, and then proceeded to travel to Paris, France, to pursue a 
medical degree. Walker chose to abandon both of those careers to enter a career in journalism, 
moving to New Orleans in 1848 to serve as the editor and foreign correspondent of the New 
Orleans Crescent. It was in this capacity that he came into contact with news on Manifest 
Destiny as well as various “violations” of the Monroe Doctrine. His biographer, Albert Z. Carr, 
attributed his later filibustering desires to his belief that they presented “the best chance for 
preventing the nation from tearing itself apart over the slavery issue” by presenting them with a 
common cause in defense of the Monroe Doctrine .100 
 His time in New Orleans was short, moving to San Francisco to continue his journalism 
career at the San Francisco Herald. In relatively short order, Walker once again became bored 
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with his chosen career and was easily distracted by filibustering efforts to travel to Sonora, 
Mexico. On October 8, 1853 he led a group of 45 men into Mexico driven partially by idealism 
but also by the desire to acquire fame and reputation for himself.101 Without firing a shot, he 
landed in La Paz and took the governor prisoner, optimistically naming himself President of the 
Republic of Lower California, and indicated to the native population that he had arrived to 
defend them from the tyranny of Mexico. At least partially in response to these actions, the 
Mexican government was encouraged to make an accord with American minister James Gadsden 
in the purchase of Northern Sonora by the United States. With this agreement, the support for his 
efforts in Sonora from his American sources dissipated and left him to attempt his planned 
revolution with minimal resources. He and his men made the decision to continue with their 
filibustering efforts, which met with relatively unsurprising failure.102 Despite this, his efforts 
established his reputation as a visionary and courageous military leader in the eyes of United 
States’ citizens and lead to the nickname “Grey-Eyed Man of Destiny.” 
 In 1854, civil war broke out in Nicaragua. The leader of the Liberal forces, Francisco 
Castellon had contacted Walker due to his reputation for fighting in Mexico. Walker had learned 
from his earlier efforts, and demanded a contract that allowed him and his men colonization 
rights, including offers of land and support.103 He merged his relatively small force of men with 
native forces, and they all became citizens of Nicaragua in addition to their citizenship in the 
United States. The Liberal forces alongside Walker successfully pushed forward and defeated the 
Conservative forces, and organized a government in Nicaragua. Patricio Rivas was chosen as the 
first president of the new government, and Walker was named General and Commander in Chief. 
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He proceeded to use his new authority to place Americans in charge of the Nicaraguan military, 
effectively making Rivas a puppet president. Soon this was not enough for Walker, and he 
arranged for elections to establish himself as President of Nicaragua. On September 22, 1856 
Walker reinstituted slavery in Nicaragua – binding the nation spiritually to the Southern nations 
of the United States and at the same time eliminating the possibility of annexation by the United 
States due to Northern opposition to slavery.104 
 His term as president of Nicaragua was limited, as the neighboring countries of Costa 
Rica and Honduras were fearful of his purported plans to create a single nation from the nations 
of Central America. He had also earned the ire of railroad tycoon Cornelius Vanderbilt. 
Vanderbilt thus proved quite willing to provide logistical and financial support to the forces of 
Costa Rica and Honduras. Within a short period, Walker was forced out of Nicaragua in May of 
1857. This did not end his filibustering desires, as he was “determined to regain what he believed 
were his rights in Nicaragua.”105 Walker proceeded to attempt three more incursions into 
Nicaragua, the final one occurring in 1860. At that point, the British navy captured him and 
turned over to the Honduran government. The Honduran government proceeded to execute 
Walker, finally ending his filibustering efforts in Central America. 
 
Walker and American Romanticism 
 One of the important keys to understanding Walker in relation to American culture was 
found in his fascination with Romantic literature. More specifically, it is valuable to understand 
how the Romantic tradition was viewed through the prism of United States cultural leanings 
towards the ideals of Manifest Destiny and United States Exceptionalism. The Romantic 
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Movement traveled from Europe to the United States shortly following the American 
Revolution. The American interpretation of Romanticism continued a strong commitment to the 
individual and the presupposition that the natural world was good. Moreover, Americans added 
their revolutionary spirit to the Romantic tradition. As the United States expanded Romanticism 
took root. It lauded both the building of the nation but also praised the inherent potential of the 
burgeoning potential of their new country.106 Romanticism thus became a distinctly American 
construct, exhibiting a strong connection to the aforementioned concepts of Manifest Destiny 
and United States Exceptionalism. In his analysis of United States Romanticism, David Morse 
noted “American literature is born of excessive claims, and burdened from the start by an 
overblown national rhetoric.”107 In essence, the United States adopted the concepts inherent in 
Romanticism. In no place is this clearer than in the concept of the Romantic hero. 
 The Romantic hero was the essence of individualism and, by extension, nationalism. The 
Romantic heroes were nothing if not commanding figures, though most often in will and persona 
rather than anything else. The classic historical example of the Romantic hero is Napoleon 
Bonaparte. In Napoleon, historians see a peasant who crowned himself emperor and championed 
revolutionary ideals. He waged war against the nations of Europe, and reached too far in 
attempting to conquer Russia. In addition to the epic background and hubris, the Romantic hero 
was often presented with a degree of fallibility as a flawed construct. Again, Napoleon provided 
an excellent example. Lord Byron sums up these characteristics as: 
“There sunk the greatest, nor the worst of men, 
           Whose spirit, antithetically mixt, 
          One moment of the mightiest, and again 
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          On little objects with like firmness fixt; 
           Extreme in all things! hadst thou been betwixt, 
           Thy throne had still been thine, or never been; 
          For daring made thy rise as fall: thou seek'st 
          Even now to re-assume the imperial mien, 
           And shake again the world, the Thunderer of the scene! 
  
         . . . quiet to quick bosoms is a hell, 
         And there hath been thy bane; there is a fire 
        And motion of the soul which will not dwell 
          In its own narrow being, but aspire 
          Beyond the fitting medium of desire; 
          And, but once kindled, quenchless evermore, 
          Preys upon high adventure, nor can tire 
           Of aught but rest; a fever at the core, 
           Fatal to him who bears, to all who ever bore.”108 
The literary characteristics noted by Byron were specifically a description of Napoleon as a 
heroic Romantic figure. The hero was inherently gifted and skilled, both in intelligence and in 
imagination. Ordinary things were unsatisfactory to them, and unacceptable. The Romantic hero 
saw himself destined for a heightened level of greatness. They stood beyond the common range 
of human experience, but ultimately were still human (with the human frailties that come with 
it). Thomas Carlyle linked it directly the Romantic hero to the historical when he spoke in 1840: 
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“For myself in these days, I seem to see this indestructability of Hero-worship the 
everlasting adamant lower than which the confused wreck of revolutionary things cannot 
fall…. That man, in some sense or other, worships Heroes; that we all of us reverence 
and must ever reverence Great Men: this is, to me, the living rock amid all rushings-down 
whatsoever; -the one fixed point in modern revolutionary history, otherwise as if 
bottomless and shoreless.”109 
His words are important in understanding the nineteenth century correlation between history and 
the Romantic hero. 
As noted above, one of the key relationships inherent to Romanticism was with the 
natural world. In his book Meditations on the Hero, Walter Reed noted that “nature is not the 
only ground against which the hero defines himself in the nineteenth century; there is also the 
ground of history. Nature and history in fact often act together as a ground for the heroic self.”110 
This relationship can be seen explicitly in the histories of the time, specifically in the work of 
Romantic historian William Prescott. Two of his heroes, Cortez and Pizarro, dominate their 
respective places in his works The Conquest of Mexico and The Conquest of Peru. Both 
historical figures were extravagantly excessive. They were insanely ambitious, and were directly 
attracted to risky and likely impossible enterprises.111 These examples are, of course, quite apt 
when considering the examination of filibustering. They presented the aesthetic of a Romantic 
hero grounded in history and going forth to conquest. 
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The connection to William Walker becomes quite clear in this context, and he fits the role 
of an American Romantic hero. Walker certainly viewed himself as an agent of special destiny. 
His legal, medical, and journalistic careers were not enough to satisfy his belief in his own 
destiny. While he was editor of the New Orleans Crescent, he wrote: “Unless a man believes that 
there is something great for him to do, he can do nothing great. Hence so many of the captains 
and reformers of the world have relied on fate and the stars. A great idea springs up in a man’s 
soul; it agitates his whole being, transports him from the ignorant present and makes him feel the 
future in a moment. It is natural for a man so possessed to conceive that he is a special agent for 
working out in practice the thought that has been revealed to him.”112 This was borne out in the 
nickname ascribed to him, that of the Grey-eyed Man of Destiny. As a young man, Walker 
seemed to have been “afflicted” with what Mark Twain referred to as “The Sir Walter 
disease.”113 The protagonist in Sir Walter Scott’s Waverly novels was himself heavily influenced 
by the works of Don Quixote, and Walker followed in that tradition with his reading and 
eventual belief in his own destined greatness. The former ambassador to Brazil summed up his 
view as an American Romantic here in an 1857 letter: “The greatest lion of Washington at 
present is General Walker of Nicaragua celebrity. I have met him several times and am very 
much pleased with him. He is a modest, retiring young man of about 30 and a perfect hero; his 
friends are convinced that he will yet return to Nicaragua and inaugurate orderly government in 
Central America. I have advised him in case of failure to try his hand in Brazil. I am rather 
inclined to become a filibuster since I have seen the fairest portion of God’s Creation rotting 
away in the hands of a decrepit race incapable of developing its resources.”114 Walker was a 
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figure of history, traveling forth to establish the natural destiny of American superiority over 
those that needed guidance so that they could properly utilize their resources. 
 The circle would continue again in the stories and presentations of Walker’s own 
exploits.  Foremost amongst these would be the play Nicaragua, or, General Walker’s Victories. 
The details of the play itself are unknown, but a surviving playbill gives some insight into the 
content. Dated for July 21st and 22nd, the playbill announced the New York production of the 
“First week of an entire New Drama of great interest by E.F. Distin, Esq. written expressly for 
this Theatre and founded on scenes of actual occurrence, & of much importance to the 
Nation.”115 The character of General Walker embodied hope and freedom, characteristics 
reflective of the public fascination with him. Audiences saw him as a dashing and romantic 
figure. Upon his expulsion from Nicaragua, theaters in Sacramento and San Francisco ran the 
“Siege of Granada” concerning the climactic moment of his failed Nicaraguan expedition. As it 
happened, the play featured New York actor C.E. Bingham, who had been present during the 
siege itself (having traveled in search of a land grant in Nicaragua).116 Walker found himself 
immortalized in poetry as well. Although his scribe did not garner the reputation of Lord Byron, 
Joaquin Miller added to the literary body of study with his poem recounting Walker’s final trip to 
Nicaragua is particularly illuminating: 
 “The Carib sea comes in so slow! 
 It stays and stats, as loathe to go, 
 A Sense of death is in the air, 
 A sense of listless, dull despair. 
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 As if Truxillo, land and tide, 
 And all thing, died when Walker died.”117 
As with other romanticized figures, poets placed Walker at the absolute center of events even in 
death. 
 
Followers of Walker 
 As noted, historians have devoted a great deal of focus to the leaders and planners of the 
filibustering movements. Understanding filibustering requires understanding those that followed 
individuals such as Walker and why they chose to do so. Stereotypes of these individuals often 
portrayed them as criminals and a variety of unsavory characters. As with most stereotypes, this 
viewpoint has a great deal of truth to it. One such individual was Jennings Estelle, a native of 
San Francisco that joined Walker’s expedition to Nicaragua, who rushed onto the boat to avoid 
charges of having stabbed a man in the streets of San Francisco. Another example can be found 
in George Tillman (brother of future Senator Ben Tillman). Tillman had killed a man in a card 
game, and escaped punishment by traveling to Nicaragua and joining Walker’s forces. Not all of 
the criminal elements that joined with Walker were violent. Parker French was a thief and a con 
man prior to joining Walker’s forces, eventually serving as one of his ambassadors to the United 
States from Walker’s government. It would not be fair, of course, to suggest that the stereotype 
was true of all those that journeyed along with Walker on his various expeditions.118 
 If this had been the case, of course, Walker would not have been able to attract nearly ten 
thousand men and women to join him during his brief stint as President of Nicaragua.119 Instead 
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it can be argued that many young men looked to better their financial situation, and viewed 
Nicaragua and filibustering as a chance to better their lot in life. In a letter written to the New 
York Herald, William Caseneau passed along facts concerning life in Nicaragua. He noted: 
“Nicaragua is rich in a vast extent of public domain of incomparable beauty and fertility, which 
is open to the whole world by a liberal plan of colonization.”120 Moreover, free passage to 
Nicaragua was offered to potential settlers as well as 80 acres of land to be provided for the 
families.  
Nicaragua also had the benefit of being a prime transit route to the West Coast. During 
the gold rush, many individuals traversed Nicaragua to reach California. Overall, those traveling 
believed they would move from poverty in America to become plantation owners in Nicaragua. 
Additionally, the American Minister to Nicaragua, George E. Squier, provided reports that added 
an additional degree of inducement to young men looking to travel to Nicaragua, noting the 
charms and general attractiveness of Nicaraguan women.121 Once again, this presented the 
possibility of social mobility. Poor settlers from the United States were presented with an 
opportunity to marry into the elite families of Nicaragua. As James Carson Jamison notes in his 
memoir, “It was natural that the hearts of even warlike ‘filibusteros’ should soften under such 
influences, and that in turn there should be a yielding by dark-eyed beauties to suppliants for 
their love. A number of the Americans married estimable Nicaraguan women.”122  
Jamison himself provides an excellent example of the kind of individual that formed a 
significant portion of the filibustering movement. As a young man, he had a desire for adventure 
and travel. His family was certainly not wealthy – when he traveled to enlist in a military unit, he 
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noted that he did not have money for food when he set out. He heard of the adventures of 
William Walker in Nicaragua, and noted that his “blood grew hot at the thought of the stirring 
adventures that awaited me if I could attach myself to Walker’s army.”123 Like many young men, 
he saw the filibustering movement as a chance for upward mobility. This created a potent 
combination of the American dream with the concept of Manifest Destiny. The socio-economic 
structure of the nation at the time did not naturally provide such advantages, which further 
increased the attraction of traveling to a foreign country as a new ruling class.124 The culture of 
Romanticism coincided with pragmatism. 
As might be expected, filibustering held a great deal of appeal among military men as 
well. It was not uncommon for soldiers in the American military to resign commissions or desert 
in order to join filibustering movements.125 Filibustering offered numerous inducements that 
service in the United States military did not. The recent wars fought by the United States had not 
brought glory or riches to the soldiers involved. Like the young men noted above, they were also 
looking for ways to improve their station. Traveling to a locale such as Nicaragua presented the 
opportunity to perform the same actions they would perform in the United States military with 
significantly enhanced rewards.  
In addition to this, filibustering presented intangible rewards. Service in the army 
provided few opportunities for glory. Even the detractors of filibusters noted that they were 
universally courageous. Those involved in writing their reminiscences of the events often noted 
the opportunities available for distinction and glory.126 The attraction was present even in 
soldiers graduating from West Point. In a letter to his mother prior to his graduation from West 
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Point, George D. Bayard wrote that, “several of us talk of going to Nicaragua. If I am not pleased 
with my Corps I think I will probably resign and go there. I could easily obtain a Captain’s 
commission & there is a good opening. Walker is greatly in want of scientific men & then he 
will want especially in organizing his ordnance and artillery… It is a fine country & wealthy. 
Gold mines have already been discovered. What do you say to Nicaragua?”127 Bayard did not 
end up joining Walker in Nicaragua, but his letter provided an invaluable insight into the mind of 
military men that may have interest in joining with the filibustering forces. Another important 
attraction was the potential for advancement in Walker’s military force. The Americans that 
joined with him quickly became officers, often being put in command of native troops. An 1856 
letter from Callendar Fayssoux to Birkett D. Fry exhibited further strength for this belief. Fry had 
failed to graduate from West Point, but in Nicaragua he served as a Brigadier General in 
command of troops.128  
There is also evidence that Walker had support from varied levels of American culture, 
including Masonic groups and educational institutions. In his own defense of Nicaragua, Walker 
noted that he was handed a message that consisted of a “small piece of paper containing some 
cabalistic signs.”129 Walker was unfamiliar with the symbology himself, but several of his 
officers were high ranking Masons and assisted him in the translation. In planning his return trips 
to Nicaragua, Walker was aided by a Mason named Hugh McLeod who consistently promoted 
Walker using his Masonic ties.130  Masonic support for filibustering was perhaps unsurprising. 
An offshoot of the Masons was a group named The Knights of the Golden Circle. Their agenda 
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strongly approved of filibustering as a means to establish a theoretical slave empire that included 
Mexico and Central America.131 Ties from earlier in Walker’s life aided him, as his connection 
with John Berrien Lindsley allowed him to present his point of view in highly public forums. In 
this case, it was in a speech made in Nashville, TN, at the capitol building. Lindsley noted in his 
diary on July 8, 1857 that a large crowd was present and the speech was “well-received.”132 
When preparing for what would be his final visit to Central America, Walker still 
expressed confidence in the success of his enterprises. In a message to Fayssoux on October 10, 
1858, Walker advised that any individuals interested in emigrating to Nicaragua should be 
prepared to depart within the next month.133 His continued efforts looked to recruit individuals 
well beyond the reprobate class normally associated with filibustering efforts. This was partially 
due to his firm belief that he was still President and Commander in Chief of Nicaragua, and thus 
still planned settlement of the country. He expressed this directly to Fayssoux in a later letter: “I 
have at last made arrangements for our return to Nicaragua. They are of such character that it 
will be difficult if not impossible for the U.S. authorities or anyone else to defeat them.”134 In 
this letter, Walker expressed his overwhelming optimism for his endeavors based upon popular 
support from the people he had been working with in his travels from New York to Washington 
to Mobile, AL.   
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Legal Status of Filibustering 
Filibustering maintained popularity despite the fact that participants were breaking 
federal law in their efforts. Legal barriers proved to be less of an obstacle than would be 
expected. In a later speech to the United States Senate, the Honorable John Slidell of Louisiana 
noted that “the popular mind has almost unerring instincts in such questions. If he be right, he 
will be sustained and applauded. If not, he must bear the consequences.”135 This seems to have 
been the overall status of prosecution in filibustering efforts. Prosecution of filibustering was 
rendered extremely difficult due to the need to prove intent. Intent often proved difficult and 
murky to prove and establish.136 The prosecution of Walker’s filibustering efforts into Sonora 
exhibited the legal difficulties quite clearly.  
The first ship Walker outfitted for transit to Sonora, the Arrow, was captured and 
impounded by General Hitchcock as it was suspected to be part of an illegal filibustering effort. 
His reward for these efforts in enforcement of the law was attacks on him from a wide variety of 
sources. The local newspapers unleashed a torrent of abuse on his actions, in support of Walker 
and his efforts. United States Senator John B. Wellin, from California, also directed criticism at 
General Hitchcock for his actions. Hitchcock was brought up on charges in court by a local judge 
for contempt, and Walker brought a trespass suit against him for $30,000. The district attorney 
delayed processing the seizure of the ship long enough to allow Walker and his men to remove 
guns and ammunition from the Arrow. They transferred the incriminating items to the Caroline, 
the vessel they would then use to travel to Sonora. Hitchcock was left with a certainty that local 
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officials were uninterested in prosecuting filibustering claims, and his efforts at interdicting such 
offenses were effectively stymied.137 
Efforts to enforce the laws opposing the filibustering efforts were equally difficult. Henry 
P. Watkins served as a procurer and recruiter for Walker’s expedition, and as such remained in 
San Francisco while many of the rest of Walker’s men were in Mexico. He was indicted on 
March 1, 1854, and brought to trial before Judge Hoffman. The arguments in court focused on 
potential unconstitutionality of the law as well as on the difficulty of proving intent. Somewhat 
disingenuously, it was claimed that the decision to invade Mexico with force of arms was taken 
only after they had already set sail for Sonora. Hoffman, concerned with the appearance of 
propriety in the case, noted to the jury that “from my heart I sympathize with the accused, but I 
am sworn to the execution of the law and must discharge my duty, whatever my sympathies may 
be.”138 This instruction to the jury led them to find Watkins guilty, leading to a fine of $1,500. 
This punishment was even less severe than it would initially appear, as the fine was never 
collected and the sentence never enforced.139 
Walker himself was brought to trial later in the year. His arguments were similar to those 
made by Watkins, but the result was quite different. Michel Foucault would reference the global 
transitions that occurred in enforcement, which can be applied more specifically to the case 
involving Willian Walker. He adopted Jeremy Bentham’s concept of the “Panopticon” to 
partially explain how society provided ceaseless inspection and judgment, enforcing the 
established norms. Allowing society the power to judge transitions, however, found its limits.140  
While given similar instructions to the jury in the Watkins case, the jury deliberated for eight 
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138 Soulé et al. 1966, 525. 
139 Owsley and Smith 1997, 55-56. 
140 Foucault 1995. 
63 
 
minutes and returned a verdict of not guilty.141 This provided a window into the opinions of the 
public at the time. As has been previously noted, filibustering held a certain romantic appeal, and 
Walker was a figure of great notoriety. He had established himself as a heroic figure, even in 
abject defeat. His connections in the news media also aided in his efforts. Although news sources 
became less supportive of filibustering efforts following the failure of the Mexican expedition, 
they still reflected a strong admiration for Walker himself and his overall efforts. Though most 
would not claim he was right, the jury made the decision that his illegal actions did not deserve 
punishment. In modern parlance, their decision would be described as jury nullification. The 
public had spoken, continuing at least tacit support for filibusters. 
The trials and experiences during the Sonora expedition made future efforts at 
filibustering simpler. The acquittal of Walker has made evident the fact that the public was 
willing to allow such actions to go unpunished. The United States government also gave minimal 
support to officials looking to enforce the Neutrality Act. Concerns over military enforcement of 
legal matters led the administration of Franklin Pierce to discourage the military from enforcing 
legal actions. When Walker planned his filibustering efforts in Nicaragua, he was informed that 
there would not be any roadblocks put in his way – in fact, the military wished him well in his 
efforts.142 Part of this was due to the carefully worded arrangement with the forces in Nicaragua, 
but it was also predicated on military knowledge that little effort would be spent in attempting to 
prosecute such crimes. 
We can find additional support for Walker’s actions by turning attention to the United 
States Congress. Although supportive of American laws, they also evinced a certain admiration 
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for the work of filibusters such as William Walker. Representative Percy Walker of Alabama (no 
relation) referred to Walker when he spoke on December 17, 1856:  
“A bold, adventurous, thoughtful man, imbued with the truest spirit of Americanism, the 
keenest instincts of his peculiar nationality, the brave, enduring pioneerism of the West and 
the South, prompt to the  faintest voice of freedom, sallies forth to establish a nationality, 
to which he would impart, by his own energy, genius, and enthusiasm, the deep love of 
liberty, industry, morality, and it might be prosperity of his own happier land.”143  
 
It can hardly be surprising that the general population would be supportive of William Walker’s 
efforts when their legislative representatives were so fulsome in their praise of the individual. 
Once again, it is important to note that the praise is not directed towards filibustering 
conceptually but rather to Walker as an individual, focusing on his spirit of Americanism and his 
status as an emblem of pioneer spirit.  
This support of Walker went even towards defying administration policy on Nicaragua. 
The Buchanan administration refused to acknowledge the Nicaraguan administration with 
Walker as President, fearing that would be going too far in their tacit approval of Walker’s 
efforts. Senator John B. Weller stated his opposition in May of 1856:  
“I am in receipt of many letters from persons residing on the Pacific coast who are 
anxious to know whether I have been sustaining the Administration policy adopted in 
regard to the Nicaraguan government. I have no information on this subject other than 
that which is published in the newspapers of the day; and, upon the facts thus presented, I 
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have no hesitation in saying that I do not approve of the course which has been 
pursued.”144  
 
Weller based his support of Walker on information obtained from newspapers and pressure 
placed on him by his constituents. Illinois Senator Stephen Douglas spoke out in support of 
Walker and his government in Nicaragua, stating that “I hold that government is as legitimate as 
any which existed in Central America… I believe that justice is more impartially administered, 
that the rights of men and the rights of property are more carefully protected and guarded under 
the existing government than under any which has prevailed in Central America.”145 Numerous 
politicians had little compunction about publicly supporting filibustering, directly fueling public 
support for William Walker. 
 
Newspapers and William Walker 
Following Walker’s efforts in Nicaragua, Horace Greeley stated in the New York Weekly 
Tribune of June 3, 1857 “In his whole career we look in vain for a single act of wisdom or 
foresight.”146 This may well be a fitting epitaph to the career of Walker, as he often seemed to act 
without extensive forethought, simply presuming things would work out. This was not, however, 
a unified opinion of the news media concerning Walker. Newspapers had, by this point, become 
one of the strongest tools for shaping public opinion. They served as the primary mechanism to 
dispense information to the public, and electronic communication (via the telegraph) had allowed 
for the information presented in newspapers to have a truly national reach. Thus, the opinions 
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and coverage in the news media serve as invaluable sources to aid us in understanding the overall 
visage of public opinion on the efforts of Walker.  
 Walker had a significant understanding of newspapers and the effect they had on public 
opinion due to his service as an editor, owner, and reporter for newspapers in both New Orleans 
and San Francisco. It was during his time in San Francisco that he came into conflict with Judge 
Levi Parsons, of whom he wrote a highly critical article indicating that his efforts to oppose 
criminal activity had failed. Parsons faced an “indignation meeting” on March 9, 1851, where 
members of the public protested against him directly. In response, Parsons fined Walker $500 
and incarcerated him until the fine was paid. The news media, as might be expected under the 
circumstances, proved to be a powerful tool lobbying for Walker. Public support rallied, and the 
Superior Court of California soon reversed the Parsons decision.147 The overall scandal affected 
Parsons far more dramatically that it did Walker, and led to an ultimately unsuccessful effort to 
impeach the judge.148 
 Public support was also initially strongly in favor of Walker’s filibustering efforts in 
Mexico. The manipulation of the media by Walker and his associates helped create this 
impression. Knowing that their efforts were dependent on public support, information passed to 
his erstwhile associates in the media indicated that his efforts were wholly successful.149 To an 
extent, the reports were true. Walker had indeed named himself president and had established 
governmental agencies.  As historian Joseph Stout noted, “recruiting men for filibustering 
expeditions to Mexico, as always, proved easy,” specifically because of the positive coverage in 
the papers.150 The spirit of Manifest Destiny was strong in California, and the success of the 
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enterprise was somewhat infectious. As was not unusual for the time, the coverage of the efforts 
in Mexico changed once the efforts were viewed as unsuccessful, with various supporters 
arrested as Walker’s forces straggled from Mexico back to the United States.151 This established 
something of a pattern for analysis and support of Walker’s efforts by the news media. 
Importantly, criticism of Walker was not directed toward his intent or his overall comportment 
but rather the unsuccessful nature of his expedition. Even when critical, the coverage served to 
be supportive of the courage and valiant efforts of the filibusters. This in turn continued to result 
in public support for their efforts, as evidenced in the previously discussed acquittal of Walker in 
his filibustering trial. 
 His filibustering efforts in Nicaragua served as the most successful effort in filibustering 
and received consequent support in the news. Far from seen as extralegal efforts that damaged 
United States diplomatic efforts, Walker’s efforts were celebrated as superior policies. The New 
York Times of February 29, 1856, stated, “in formally claiming and annexing the Mosquito Coast 
Territory, the Administration, of which General Walker is the secret spring, has taken a bold but 
justifiable step. The act abolishes with one blow the British protectorate and its absurd 
assumptions, removes our most serious cause of quarrel with England, and annexes a tract of 
land to the State which it legitimately and naturally belongs.”152 Through this article we can draw 
a great deal of information. The article not only acknowledged Walker’s role as general but also 
directly credited him as a primary mover in the government of Nicaragua. The article also 
complimented Walker’s efforts against the government of Britain. As far as public opinion was 
concerned, this certified his efforts and the efforts of filibusters as bulwarks against foreign 
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intervention. Filibusters served as guardians of the Monroe Doctrine, and consequently as 
extensions of America’s established foreign policy.  
 His efforts continued to find media support, even as military forces in the neighboring 
country of Costa Rica began to mass against him. The New York Times of April 22, 1856, 
continued to support Walker, noting that his “endeavors to preserve peaceful relations with the 
Central American States have doubtless been sincere.”153 The article proceeded to somewhat 
presciently place the blame for Walker’s difficulties on tycoon Cornelius Vanderbilt, whose 
financial interests in Nicaragua had been abrogated by Walker’s administration. Once again, 
Walker’s efforts were evaluated as fair and just by the newspaper. The Richmond Enquirer of 
April 22, 1856, continued this support, acknowledging that Walker was “sowing a good seed for 
future harvests of civilization.”154 Walker had been lionized as a hero, defended as a protector of 
fundamental values of both the United States in general and civilization in specific. As in San 
Francisco, this impression of Walker was manufactured. One of the filibusters, Charles Callahan, 
wrote that he had arranged for information to be released that would “give you a good notice, as 
he wanted you to be placed properly before the public.”155 Critiques of Walker’s efforts, on the 
other hand, focused on issues of less concern to the public. The New York Tribune blasted 
Walker’s government as “nothing but a military despotism which sustains itself by forced 
contributions upon a population impoverished by his exaction.”156 While inarguably accurate, the 
American public was unlikely to be moved by the plight of the peoples of Nicaragua when 
Walker was heralded in other instances as an extension of American strength in the Western 
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Hemisphere. In the mind of the United States public, Walker and his cohorts were heroes. 
Walker’s hometown paper, the Republican Banner responded directly to the attacks on him: 
“In view of the importance and responsibility of the position occupied by Gen. Walker, 
and of the unspeakably atrocious libels on his private character which have been recently 
published in the New York Tribune, Louisville Courier and other newspapers of extensive 
circulation, it was eminently fit that the people of this place, in the midst of whom he was 
born and reared, should meet together and bear their willing and emphatic testimony to 
the purity of his character and the undeviating rectitude of his conduct in all the relations 
of life, during the long period – from infancy to mature manhood – in which he dwelt 
among them.”157 
 
The article referenced a public meeting held in Nashville, evincing support for William Walker. 
This article, like many in support of filibustering, walked a fine line. The newspaper established 
that it had little sympathy for filibustering in general, but that “as the whole world knows” 
Walker was the legal leader of the nation and had done everything he could to establish friendly 
relations. In essence, filibustering, in general, was frowned upon, but the results of filibustering 
efforts were lauded.  
 Even after Walker’s expulsion from Nicaragua, newspapers followed with great interest 
his continued efforts to return to the nation he claimed legal rights to. The Louisville Daily 
Courier, though generally opposed to Walker’s efforts, noted that General Walker was one of the 
most talked about individuals of the day.158  Once again Walker was accorded the title of 
General. Even as he continued his fruitless efforts, newspapers still seemed to provide him a 
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great deal of support. The New Orleans Crescent of September 12, 1860, provides a direct 
example of this. “His persistency and gallantry in the matter, whether his cause be just or not, 
cannot but excite our admiration. Three failures seem not to have abated his zeal or destroyed his 
hopes.”159 Once again, the newspapers expressed support for Walker in general. The distinction 
between the actor and his actions blurred, as they placed favorable judgment on him without a 
similar analysis of his actions. 
 Through Walker, it is possible to see how filibustering was viewed prior to the Civil War. 
The United States public certainly understood that it was illegal and rarely supported 
filibustering in theory. Conceptually, the public saw filibusters as little more than pirates and 
freebooters. In fairness, that is essentially what they were. Nonetheless, in specific instances the 
public evinced a willingness to see filibusters as heroes. Walker achieved the greatest fame by 
being able to provide a symbol of what Americans saw as good aspects of filibustering. Manifest 
Destiny demanded the export of American ideology, eventually to cover the entire hemisphere. 
In the 1840s, official governmental policy stopped looking for extensive territory additions. It 
only made sense that enterprising citizens would look to privatize the efforts.  
 Numerous filibusters made the journey south in order to acquire territory, although the 
specter of Walker loomed over them. This is at least partially explained by his obvious success, 
naming himself “president” twice, and holding the office for an extended period in Nicaragua. 
The cultural support granted to Walker cannot be underestimated, and needs acknowledgement. 
Although many Americans would likely prefer to forget the past, it is true that we once lionized a 
criminal in his efforts to establish a slave republic in Central America. Over his career, the public 
lauded Walker for his ability to command men and for his honor and valor. Individuals followed 
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him for a variety of reasons, but many saw it as an opportunity. Walker, and by extension 
filibustering, was an instrument of Manifest Destiny and American ideals that the popular 
consciousness embraced in the decades prior to the Civil War. 
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CHAPTER 4: LA GUERRA NACIONAL 
Nineteenth-Century Neo-Conquistadors 
 In July 1854, the editors of Boletín del Ejército Democrático de Nicaragua, a Leónese 
publication, presented a poem entitled “To the Year 1854 on the Night of December 31, 1853,” 
which read: 
And you, 1854, what can you tell us? 
Is your news good or gloomy? 
Will your days be sad and mournful 
Or prosperous, happy, cheerful? 
But, oh woe!, when a four appears in any decade 
The trouble surely infiltrates that year, 
As in 1814 when war erupted, 
Events that repeated themselves in 1824.  
Remember the turbulence of 1834, 
Whose desolate memories still haunt us, 
Just as does fateful 1844, with its fires, 
Its assaultes, its deaths, and its disasters.160 
 
By the time of the publication of this poem, of course, the editors were well aware of the events 
unfolding in 1854 in Nicaragua. In many ways, it fit well the fearful expectations present in the 
poem. The liberal leaders of Nicaragua had been exiled, and the Supreme Director Fruto 
Chamorro continued with his stated goal of creating a new constitution, calling together the 
Constituent Assembly on January 22.  He spoke to the people when he said, “We urgently need 
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to strengthen the principle of authority so weakened and neglected by us. This can be achieved 
by giving the executive greater power, authority, and consistency; and by surrounding the office 
with a certain pomp and majesty which will command the respect due the office.”161  
These words presented cold comfort to the Liberals ensconced in León and most 
especially to those in exile for their opposition to the government. Vijil, a Liberal member of the 
clergy in Granada, was marginalized in the city that was his home due to his political ideology. 
The constitution put forth in April of 1854 was well suited to the Conservative ideology 
exhibited by Chamorro. True to his word, the constitution greatly enhanced the position of the 
executive in Nicaragua, now the president of the Republic of Nicaragua. The following month, a 
group of Liberals commanded by Máximo Jerez arrived in Nicaragua, landing at Realejo. In the 
past decades, such an action was relatively routine in the continued struggle between the rival 
city-states in Nicaragua. 1854 would prove different. As has already been noted, the promise of a 
Nicaraguan canal had fired foreign imaginations, and the small Central American nation had the 
attention and interest of both the United States and Great Britain. Jerez’ invasion would engender 
something new in Nicaragua and Central America as a whole. The conflict, referred to as La 
Guerra Nacional, would last until 1857 and in the end encompass all of the Central American 
nations. This war would be the bloodiest experienced by nineteenth-century Nicaragua, and 
perhaps the bloodiest in nineteenth-century Central America as a whole.162 
The prose and poetry of the time was in many ways emblematic of the political strife 
between the two cities. One morning in León many would find doors affixed with a poem 
entitled, “Arithmetic in Verse,” that gave a formula including 30 pounds of ignorance, 1000 
pounds of petulance, and 100 yards of arrogance as some of the constituent elements of the 
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denizens of Granada.163 The poets of Granada, not to be outdone, presented a lengthy parody of a 
Mass wherein the liberals of León were castigated roundly, “Hated Provisional Government, 
trinity and one, Castellón, Jerez, and Guerrero, Father, son, and cursed spirit of the revolution, in 
whom we do not believe, from whom we expect only evil, and whom we hate with all our 
body.”164 The years of internecine warfare had served to intensify the rhetoric of conflict 
between the cities of León and Granada. Padre Vijil was not one of the individuals advocating 
for greater bloodshed and violence, however. His focus, as might be expected, was on his duties 
as a priest in Granada. His previous political efforts presented him with a strong belief that the 
violence needed to end. During his time in Granada, Padre Vijil had consistently preached for 
peace and an end to the violence that tore across his nation.165 His efforts toward this end fell on 
deaf ears to those in power, but the people of Granada loved and respected him for his 
eloquence.166 It may be suspected that the political leanings of the elites and their struggles 
meant little for those that were outside of such hallowed political circles, forced to watch as 
military forces consistently ripped apart Nicaragua seeking ideological and geographical 
dominance. 
The civil war itself began exceptionally well for the Liberals, as they scored numerous 
victories in the first months and by the end of May were besieging the Conservative stronghold 
of Granada.167 Brutality followed on both sides in similar measure. Liberals took their motto of 
“Liberty or Death” seriously, including the execution of surrendering prisoners. The 
Conservative motto of “Legitimacy or Death” served them in a similar manner. The Liberal army 
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arrived at the gates of Granada, and laid siege to the Conservative stronghold. Granada held, and 
the siege ended in February of 1855. The changing situation allowed Conservative forces to 
retake the majority of Nicaragua, save for León itself. Conservative president Fruto Chamorro 
died in March of that same year, with José Maria Estrada taking his place. General Ponciano 
Corrall, second in command of the Conservative army, took Chamorro’s place as commanding 
general.168 As might be expected given the vitriolic rhetoric, the transition of power did nothing 
to lessen the hostilities. The Liberals in León established their own provisional government, and 
elected Francisco Castellón as their supreme director (as the Constitution of 1838 referred to the 
chief executive). Castellón summoned General José Trinidad Muñoz to assume command of the 
military forces. Attempts by Castellón to negotiate an end to the civil war in June of 1855 proved 
fruitless, as the Conservatives were confident of their inevitable victory. Padre Manuel Alcaine 
attempted to lead reconciliation efforts but such work, sadly, was doomed to failure as the 
Conservatives were unwilling to come to terms that involved compromise.169 This failure to 
resolve issues internally would attract the attention of multiple outside nations, drawing them 
into the Nicaraguan conflict. 
In 1854, Castellón had begun efforts to seek aid for the Liberal forces in Nicaragua. One 
of these entreaties had been to recruit mercenaries from the United States via an individual 
named Byron Cole, a newspaper associate of Walker.170 In the end, he agreed to recruit 300 
mercenaries from the United States under the command of William Walker, fresh from his 
acquittal for crimes stemming from his failed invasion of Sonora, Mexico. Walker and his fellow 
soldiers were to be granted Nicaraguan citizenship as well as 52,000 acres of land for their 
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service. Historian Robert May noted that without the civil strife and invitation it was extremely 
unlikely that Walker would have ever considered filibustering in Nicaragua.171 Castellón was to 
be somewhat disappointed by the mercenary force he acquired, as Walker set forth from San 
Francisco with only 57 fellow filibusters towards Nicaragua.172 Six weeks later, he and his men 
arrived in Realejo. According to both himself and his biographer, Walker was met by cheering 
and smiling crowds excited for the newcomers that were to be of aid in the battles against the 
Conservative forces of Granada. Walker and his forces proceeded towards their destination in 
León, where they encountered the first evidences of ecclesiastical support from an unnamed 
priest in the Liberal held city who remarked that “Nicaragua needs only the aid of the United 
States to become an Eden of beauty and the garden of the world.” 173 Such words certainly 
reflected the role Walker saw for himself in coming to the beleaguered nation of Nicaragua.  
In June of 1855, the Conservative government of Granada reacted to the threat of the 
foreigners by attempting to appeal to the patriotism of Nicaraguans. The government announced 
to the citizenry, “Let the civil war, then, which now rends us asunder in so lamentable a manner, 
be brought to a close; and let all citizens of Nicaragua fix their eyes upon the integrity of the 
national territory and resolve to preserve it at all hazards.”174 President Estrada put forth a decree 
to this effect as well, ordering that “All able bodied citizens of Nicaragua are called to arms to 
defend the independence of the country against foreign piratical invasion which threatens us.”175 
Even Padre Vijil, on the outside of the Nicaraguan government, was contacted concerning threats 
to Nicaragua. The threats indicated were not only to the independence of Nicaragua, but threats 
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that the foreign invaders would destroy the Catholic religion in Nicaragua as well. Vijil 
responded diffidently, reaffirming his trust in God and promising to continue his service as cura 
(priest) for Granada.176 
Castellón had sent a British soldier, Charles Doubleday, along with Colonel Ramírez of 
the army to greet the arrival from the United States. Doubleday’s assistance would prove to be 
important, as Walker arrived in Nicaragua unable to speak any Spanish at all. Doubleday served 
as translator between Walker and Castellón.177 Castellón greeted the arrival of Walker with some 
degree of relief. Up to that point, the war had been proceeding poorly for the Liberal contingent. 
They had been pushed back to León and the rumors indicated that Granada was being reinforced 
by troops from Guatemala and Honduras. It was Castellón who determined to name Walker and 
his men the “American Phalanx.” These mercenaries were referred to as “colonists” to avoid 
potential issues with United States authorities. Granadan protests of these actions were ignored at 
the time, but with the benefit of hindsight seem terribly prescient: 
Those Nicaraguans themselves invite in their own executioner, who will enchain them 
before marching them off to their deaths. It is unacceptable to see that, when the nation 
faces an eminent danger, they do not put aside personal ambitions to join in a common 
fight against the outside enemy. They, too, face a great danger; they, too, will be 
adversely affected by the outsiders. Yet they persist in their crime of keeping the nation 
divided by weakening the Republic through the continuation of this unjust and barbaric 
war.  
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Who would have ever believed it? The party that calls itself Democratic, composed of 
Nicaraguans themselves, has signed a contract with foreigners to deliver our country to 
them. Those monsters have not hesitated to sell our holy Fatherland… Those miserable 
creatures hold ambition more dearly than ties of blood, than the life of their nation 
Nicaragua.178 
 
These concerns would perhaps have seemed more sincere were they not simply the inverse, the 
Conservatives blaming the Liberals for a war that both were involved in. The blame for the 
invitation of foreigners to the war also rings hollow, as Guatemalan forces were at the time 
providing aid and financing to the Conservative government of Granada. Nonetheless, the arrival 
of Walker would dramatically change the course of the war and culminated in great change for 
the entirety of Central America. 
 Castellón’s pleasure at the arrival of the mercenaries from San Francisco was not shared 
by his commanding general. Castellón, without consulting General Muñoz, had granted Walker 
command of his own force and provided him with an additional two hundred Nicaraguan soldiers  
to support his efforts. As in the past, a visiting conquistador would be provided with native 
support in his efforts. Walker presented his plan to move towards the Nicaraguan transit routes 
and take the fight to the Granadan forces. Muñoz adamantly opposed Walker’s aims and 
appeared on the whole unimpressed and suspicious of Walker and his aims. Muñoz insisted that 
Walker remain in León to provide support in case of a Conservative attack. His reasoning was 
not unsound, as the war of a decade earlier had led to the burning of León. Walker was 
diametrically opposed to Muñoz’ plans, arguing that it was his duty to win the war. An argument 
can be made, of course, for concern from Walker about opposition to his goals in Nicaragua. 
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Although he likely did not have specific plans for the Central American nation, it is unlikely that 
he would be satisfied with the route of Cincinnatus, retiring to a farm once his military victories 
were completed. Muñoz presented a challenge to his eventually assuming political authority. 
Walker convinced Castellón that the best plan was to break the stalemate, and the chief executive 
overruled his commanding general in the matter. Chronicler James Jeffrey Roche noted that, 
“Walker had seen enough of his new friends to convince himself that his ambition had nothing to 
fear from such men. Castellón was an amiable and irresolute gentleman; Muñoz was ambitious 
and vain, but incapable. The native soldiery were ill-trained and feeble-minded. Faction had 
stifled any faint sparks of patriotism in their breasts.”179 His respect for the people he was 
coming to aid was never great, but Walker was skilled at masking this disrespect when politically 
necessary. Nonetheless, he saw himself as a savior for the people of Nicaragua. Tired and 
exhausted from decades of near constant warfare, the people of Nicaragua were indeed looking 
for a dramatic change in their overall fortunes. 
 Walker understood that his path to power in Nicaragua was dependent on control of the 
transit route. The transit route would allow him to recruit to his cause, as well as provide access 
to money and supplies from the United States. His forces travelled down to the Nicaraguan city 
of Rivas where Walker, in what would become his favored tactic, ordered a frontal assault. The 
first battle of Rivas occurred on June 29, 1855, with Walker’s forces facing a near total defeat. It 
appeared to Walker that someone in León had leaked his plans. Unsurprisingly, Walker believed 
that Muñoz was at fault. Walker was forced to return to León to resupply and to provide 
additional protection to the city, as Muñoz had originally ordered. The unexpected death of 
Muñoz on August 18, amid rumors of assassination, rid Walker of his primary rival in León and 
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made the Liberal forces even more dependent on him and his forces. Many of the Nicaraguans 
had come to believe that Walker supported their cause, and support for him grew following the 
loss of the old Nicaraguan military hero.180 Walker was once again able to proceed with his own 
plan of attack in la guerra nacional. 
 In late August, Walker led his phalanx toward San Juan del Sur and captured Virgin bay, 
a vital portion of the western section of the transit line. This was to be Walker’s first taste of 
victory in Nicaragua. Control of the western end of the transit line gave Walker access, as 
expected, to reinforcements from the United States. From September 13 until October 3 Walker 
remained in San Juan del Sur collecting recruits from San Francisco. In addition to recruiting 
additional troops, Walker assessed financial “contributions” on foreign nationals in San Juan del 
Sur, including United States Consul John Priest, in order to support his militarization efforts.181  
He had also garnered additional support from León in his efforts, which led him to consider an 
audacious plan. Walker had received intelligence indicating that the Conservative forces in 
Granada had weakened, and determined that an assault on Granada was in order. On October 11, 
he seized control of the Accessory Transit Company steamer Virgin. On October 12, Walker and 
his men boarded the “captured” steamer and made their way to Granada. At midnight, 200 
United States troops and 300 Nicaraguans disembarked two miles to the northeast of Granada. 
On October 13, 1855, Walker assumed control of Granada on behalf of the Liberal forces of 
León. The battle itself took as little as fifteen minutes, and President Estrada fled the city.182 
According to the first edition of Walker’s own newspaper, the citizenry was calmed when 
Walker enforced strict discipline on his troops. The next day, October 14, was a Sunday. It 
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would open with a sermon in the main cathedral given by Padre Vijil as he returned to political 
life in Granada. 
 
The North Star 
The sermon given by Padre Vijil opened with a passage from the book of Luke, verse 52: 
“He has brought down the powerful from their thrones, and lifted up the lowly.” In many ways, it 
was entirely appropriate to his perception of events in Nicaragua. Vijil was, as has been noted, 
often torn between the various views vying for the future of Nicaragua. By birth and inheritance, 
he was of Granada. By education and viewpoint, he was of León. He served in an early Liberal 
government, but found politics not to his liking. He was persecuted by Conservatives upon his 
return to Granada, making his life difficult there and eventually directing him to the priesthood. 
His time in service to the Church had further expanded his view, as he interacted with those that 
were outside of the realms of the elites that were constantly warring for political supremacy in 
his home country. Both sides had shown an unwillingness to compromise or work with one 
another, with years of peace simply an interlude before a continuation of war. In a letter written 
in 1855, Vijil indicated that he was trusting in God to solve the problems of Nicaragua. He 
pointedly likened their situation with the struggle between David and the Philistine Goliath, 
taking comfort in God’s protection of the just.183  
The opening verse, like the rest of his sermon, serves as an important aid in 
understanding the mindset of Padre Vijil and, through that, the mindset of Nicaragua in October 
of 1855. The verse highlights two motifs presented by Luke. The first of these is God as a 
warrior, engaging in battle on behalf of his beleaguered people. His will fights through them, and 
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eventually brings his people to deliverance. He also calls forth the idea of God as merciful being, 
who remembers the less fortunate and the needy. The overthrow of temporal rulers serves not as 
a punitive act of vengeance but rather as an additional mercy. The burdens of rule are harsh, and 
often corrupting. The removal from power allows for those that have been brought low also to 
experience salvation.184 Importantly, Vijil draws upon imagery that traditionally presupposes the 
coming of salvation. The intent of this verse would thus seem to be to bring to light one of Vijil’s 
most devoutly sought goals – peace and prosperity for all of Nicaragua. The idea of Nicaragua as 
a potential Eden had long been a dream of both himself and other observers of the Nicaraguan 
nation.  
The sermon was given on October 14. On October 13, Padre Vijil had retired to his small 
finca outside of Granada. On that morning, he was surprised by numerous individuals coming to 
his home requesting his assistance in dealing with the invaders that had entered Granada in the 
dark of the night.185 The Conservative (Legitimist) forces in Granada had been insignificant, and 
had presented little resistance to Walker’s forces. Within a period of hours, rule of the city had 
changed. Dionisio Chamorro, brother of the late president of Nicaragua, and Mateo Mayorga, the 
Nicaraguan Secretary of State under President Estrada, were both taken into custody. As Walker 
put it, they were under the “protection of American rifles.”186 Previous conquests of cities had 
led to fire and destruction. Walker’s taking of prisoners and entering the city with an army 
fanned the flames of these fears, although actual flames were still many months away for 
Granada. The citizens of the city primarily hoped that the sudden violence was over. Walker 
freed approximately one hundred political prisoners, including Patricio Rivas (who would 
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become the Nicaraguan president), and made a point of instructing his followers to “do no 
violence to the city or the people therein.”187 A direct appeal by Padre Vijil on October 13 led to 
at least the semblance of freedom for those Conservative figures that had been taken captive 
following the fighting. Vijil was noted to have been “above all selfishness and calculation” in 
assisting those that had in the previous years made life difficult for him and his associates.188  
Perhaps surprisingly, Walker acceded to the Padre’s requests for clemency towards his 
Conservative captives. It may be assumed that his credentials as a supporter of the Liberals made 
his word more valued in the immediate situation, and his eloquence would certainly serve to aid 
in calming Granada. The Conservative government traditionally had the support of the Church in 
Nicaragua and pointedly reminded the clergy that the Yankee invaders entering their country 
were not adherents of Roman Catholicism and would not be respectful of the beliefs held dear by 
those in Nicaragua.189 Walker defied these expectations of him, choosing instead to respect the 
Church and the clergy. Thus, the clergy that should by all rights have been alarmed by the 
presence of a protestant conqueror in their midst were congratulatory to him and his goals of 
peace in Nicaragua. Over the course of his short time in Nicaragua, the Church would go so far 
as to loan money to the Walker government.190 Specifically, Padre Vijil donated the parish funds 
along with 963 ounces of silver taken from the Altar of the Merced Church and the statue of the 
Virgin of Mercedes, in order to aid Walker in acquiring war materials.191 It is likely that a part of 
the Church hierarchy acknowledged the political reality that was soon to be evident – that 
Walker and his forces had succeeded in conquering Nicaragua. Moreover, they likely considered 
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events in a similar manner as Padre Vijil. The hope among many was that Walker’s arrival 
would impose peace on the troubled nation, no matter how restrictive or controlling such a peace 
would be. His conciliatory relationship with ecclesiastical figures surely supported their 
conclusions in the short term.192 
Walker almost immediately worked to solidify his connections to Nicaragua in general, 
and to the Church in specific, when he and a number of his officers attended mass the next 
morning. As noted, Padre Vijil began with the biblical verse discussed previously. He went on to 
summarize the situation of the day for both the modern-day conquistadors and the citizenry of 
Nicaragua, still undoubtedly concerned with the events of the previous day: 
The clash of arms caused by this phalanx of Americans awoke the inhabitants from a 
restful sleep, because of both the dangers of the events themselves and the general 
concern for the changing fate of the Government and the city. Powerful men yesterday, 
today fugitives; the oppressed a few days prior were facing penalties are now armed and 
threatening revenge… fueling thoughts of revenge… 
How long have our dreams called to us for this sudden change? 
When the initial abuses ensued there was a fear of greater abuse, and some city residents 
came to demand my presence in this extraordinarily difficult situation. In observance of 
my priestly duties and the voluntary inclinations of my feelings toward those that suffer 
persecution, I promptly agreed. The greatest dangers ran between the vanquished and the 
victorious, and I went to the victorious military commander to demand clemency.193 
 
                                                 
192 Burns 1991, 200. 
193 Vijil 1930, 151-155. 
85 
 
Here, Vijil lays out the events and his role within them. As a priest, he obviously presents 
himself as a protector of the oppressed and is willing to intercede on their behalf despite potential 
dangers to him. Interestingly, he also calls forth very quickly the exhortation to consider how 
long the people of Nicaragua have been dreaming and meditating on the potential for sudden and 
dramatic change, a move away from the most recent civil war and the sequence of past civil wars 
that had caused such difficulty for the nation in decades past. The role he has chosen for himself, 
of peacemaker, is also made clear by his word choice. It is also telling that the victorious military 
commander he stood against now attends mass with the rest of the citizens of Nicaragua. 
 The next section of his sermon focused on examining the recent history of Nicaragua, and 
the events that had preceded the extraordinarily recent events of the previous morning: 
Since our independence, we have lived in perpetual division and almost constant armed 
struggle, interrupted by short truces and weak peace efforts, without looking at the 
horrific damage done to the foundation of our national institutions. Within such divisions 
and blood strife lies hatred, the rodent cancer of the community that has made roots in a 
Nicaraguan society that has fought herself. Jesus Christ, our Lord, said: Love your 
enemies. But we have lived apart from God and we have underestimated the wise 
teachings from above 
All too violent acts committed in our public threaten the existence of this unfortunate 
novice Republic, interrupting its development and what is more concerning, putting in 
danger of losing our sacred religion, and the heritage of our forefathers. We give 
accommodation to unhealthy feelings towards the unjust laws that have afflicted the 
Republic with fines, forced labor and prison, eager to run rampant to ruin. And the many 
disasters, tears, and blood spilled in vain, did not move or encourage change? Will we 
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acquiesce relapse to complete disaster? We manifest at least a truce, and then take with 
new resolution our duties to the homeland, in order to garner for our country the respect 
and admiration of other peoples.194 
 
In his examination of the decades since independence, Vijil obviously acknowledges the 
bloodshed and armed struggle. It is unclear to whom he refers to as the forefathers of the 
Nicaraguan nation, but it is clear that he believes that the current government and the political 
will has failed the promise of the nation. It is here where we can gain greater understanding of 
why a Nicaraguan partisan such as Vijil would be willing to countenance a drastic change in the 
form of government in Nicaragua. Vijil does not ignore efforts that have been made by 
Nicaraguans themselves: 
During the last years, Nicaragua has been increasingly bleeding to death without getting 
honorable results. Thousands of victims have been sacrificed for the sake of a cruel 
struggle, claiming abandoned crop fields, destroying livelihoods, without respect and 
honor for life, the gift that comes from Providence, worthless because hate of our 
neighbor has eliminated piety in the hearts of men, as if the excitations of War made us 
forget the eternal truths of justice and mercy, being as a result of the setbacks and hollow 
victories, a struggle between siblings, a wide trail of blood and prosecution, families in 
discord and separated from the love of close friends, and the cities and towns torn by 
fierce hatred with most unfortunate consequences. I have always preached peace, 
harmony and progress through labor and fought against calling for more blood. This is 
the picture of our beloved Nicaragua in their present and past. Therefore I exhort 
moderation, put aside party passions have caused many evils and stolen the path of peace. 
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Peace is the most valuable benefit of a people, as it comes from God and is the reward for 
our good deeds, all under His wings thrive because it is inexhaustible source of 
happiness: the sciences and the arts, agriculture, industry, trade as it receives the impulse 
that develops that is life: Peace, sovereign, conquering the whole of civilized cultured 
society should be our aspiration.195 
 
Walker later acknowledged the power of this sermon in highlighting the difficulties facing 
Nicaragua, focusing on how the hatred and war had been more important to many than the 
building of a strong nation.196 This was a lesson that Vijil had been preaching for decades, and 
had hoped for as far back as his first government positions and his hopes for the coming of 
Herrera. Even at a young age, he had come to the conclusion that the strife in his nation was best 
addressed by those outside of Nicaragua. His experience with his family and education certainly 
supported this viewpoint, and the decades had done nothing to end the apparent intransigence of 
his home. 
 As with many Liberals in Latin America, Vijil was particularly appreciative of the United 
States as a model of progress. The Conservatives maintained a closer relation with Great Britain, 
but those interested in progress saw much to admire in the United States. Argentinian writer 
Domingo Faustio Sarmiento noted that, “when a nation engages in a revolution, it is begun by 
the conflict between two opposing interests, the revolutionary and the conservative.”197 This 
belief characterized Vijil’s earliest views, but as time passed his views changed to believe an 
outside influence would be more salubrious than merely a revolutionary spirit. His sermon then 
turned toward discussion of the mass’s guest of honor: 
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I hope the current situation change to one of harmony amongst Nicaraguans. You know 
that by the provisions issued by the General Walker, this illustrious and talented man, you 
are guaranteed promises for the people, for the home, and for our work, trying to reach a 
satisfactory and intelligent understanding between the parties involved. 
If General Walker is encouraged in such laudable purposes, holding his standard among 
the men he commands, making it acceptable to our loyalist brothers and our Leon 
brothers, as a necessity of the times, it will have achieved the real victory. A victory not 
of surprise and the capture of a place, but a superior victory, exceeding our best hopes, 
and will win our appreciation. It will be sent to Providence to heal wounds and reconcile 
the divided Nicaraguan family, because being the instrument of peace and ending cruel 
hostilities, deserves the esteem of this afflicted land for that worst of misfortunes: the 
civil war. And then, when a new sun shines, not on death camps but on cultivated land; 
not on contested cities but in the cities in the best agreement, holding beneficial 
relationships, extended trade in the Republic, with unfettered free movement then we can 
say to General Walker that our present war is the beach, but that with him our better 
impulses shall move us forward, feeling the need to comply with noble aspirations that 
are elements of civilization before the chaos of war, to change in a providential way,  
mediator in the dispute of these parties, respecting the lives, property, religion, and 
family of the vanquished, and iris of Concordia, Guardian Angel of Peace, North Star to 
the aspirations of a beleaguered people. 
General Walker has come from that great Republic blessed of God, where the current 
practices of life include respect for the weak and peace among men, ideas that, as 
civilized societies this country saw fit to organize their citizenry with this spirit, and 
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patriotic and unassuming men like Washington and Franklin, in particular the former, 
glittering atop of the American nation as its protector.198 
 
Vijil provided fulsome praise indeed for a man he had met only the day before. There is no 
record of what conversations occurred between Walker and Vijil, but evidently they were 
sufficient to convince the priest of Walker’s sincerity and make him inclined to give credit to the 
promises made by the Tennessean filibuster.199 Historians have paid particular attention to his 
words of adulation, such as “Guardian Angel” and “North Star,” focusing on how the orator 
established Walker as a great man on par with the “founding fathers” of the United States, 
George Washington and Benjamin Franklin.200 The links in the paragraph after his fulsome 
praise of Walker bear out more of what Vijil was hoping, given his admiration of the United 
States. United States Minister John H. Wheeler mentioned this bias on the part of Vijil, noting 
that he “expressed much desire that the United States should own Nicaragua and prevent their 
sanguinary revolutions. I replied that under the Treaty with England the United States could not 
protect or own Nicaragua. He then hoped that North Americans would come and settle and 
finally possess the country.”201 Vijil’s obvious imagination for the United States was evident, 
and the supposed plan was for Walker and his forces to become citizens of Nicaragua, settling in 
the acreage offered to them for their assistance in the Liberal cause in Nicaragua. In many ways, 
Vijil was seeing what he wanted to see. The forces of progress had arrived to become part of the 
progress of Nicaragua. 
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 Vijil completed his sermon by reminding the people of the advantages presented by a 
closer connection to the United States. He was likely not aware that the government had seen 
little profit from the works of the Accessory Transit Corporation, but he was more obviously 
aware of the plans presented to make Nicaragua the center of the Western hemisphere, and 
bringing to reality the dreams of those that saw such incredible untapped potential in Nicaragua. 
The nation had seen many citizens of the United States travel across the nation on their way to 
the promise of gold in California. These individuals carried with them dreams of prosperity, 
combined with the potential for a canal to connect the Atlantic and Pacific oceans through 
Nicaragua. The final paragraph of his sermon called forth these ideas of progress directly: 
Perhaps, God grant it, the changed situation of yesterday is to the mutual benefit, that 
men called to revolution aspire to the higher purpose that is the gift of Providence, that 
these men put into practice the pulse of progress that has been formed, because our 
interest is to be in obtaining peace, output of industry, the work of our children, and a 
world we can only imagine. These same Americans, as with others who have come to our 
lands from the United States, will be constructors of communication between two oceans, 
carrying Nicaragua, hand in hand, to the grandeur intended by its position on the 
continent and natural blessings, bring to us the valued advantages of civilized relations 
with the rest of the world, and the sight of their ships and flags in the heart of our 
territory.202 
 
The sermon was calculated to provide support for Walker, and to provide a balm to the fears of 
the beleaguered city. Vijil sustained his reputation as the foremost Nicaraguan orator of his time 
as he established the inherent problems faced by Nicaraguans, looking toward the North as a 
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panacea that would be able to heal all the problems in Nicaragua. His sermon, as appropriate, 
ended with a benediction: 
 
May our Lady Mother, kind intercessor between man and God, grant us His beneficent 
protection. 
Amen203 
 
Unfortunately, this intercession between man and God would not bring the beneficent protection 
prayed for. The goals of Walker were not in accord with the greater glory of Nicaragua and were 
directed more towards his own aggrandizement. 
 
Aquí Fue Granada 
In 1855, Walker was able to garner a significant amount of support from a wide cross-
section of Nicaraguans, not all of which were affiliated with the Liberals in their efforts to “save” 
Nicaragua. Despite his promises, he reminded the remaining Conservative forces in Rivas that he 
held their families and political associates in Granada hostage. A treaty was quickly put together 
for the various parties to sign. True to his history as a journalist, Walker looked to solidify his 
rule by creating a way to communicate with the people of Nicaragua – his newspaper, El 
Nicaraguense. On October 23, a mere ten days after his victory in Granada, his newspaper 
announced that “A peace is about to be framed between the so-called Legitimate and Democratic 
Parties of Nicaragua.”204 The treaty effectively brought an end to the Nicaraguan civil war. One 
of the Liberal Democrats freed by Walker’s forces in Granada, Patricio Rivas, was chosen as the 
chief executive in a provisional non-partisan government, despite being something of a political 
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non-entity. On October 30, 1855, Wheeler contacted Secretary of State William L. Marcy with a 
note that the peace treaty had been signed between General Walker and General Corral. Rivas, 
despite his lack of political activity, was noted by Wheeler as being “esteemed as one of the best 
men of the Republic.”205 He further optimistically stated that “It is confidently believed that the 
present condition of things will be permanent and that substantial peace, for the first time in 30 
years, reigns in Nicaragua.”206 Walker’s goal was the unity of Conservative and Liberal factions 
of Nicaragua. Eventually he would succeed in this goal, though certainly not in the way he had 
intended to accomplish it. 
The literature of Nicaragua focused attention on Walker as salvation for Nicaragua, 
indicating that it was not just Padre Vijil and his associates that were enthusiastic for Walker’s 
new direction. The introduction of a non-partisan government that combined both Liberals and 
Conservatives, with Walker as commander-in-chief of the Nicaraguan military, led many to think 
that the days of tyrannical rule were ended. As is usual in Nicaraguan politics, a poem was 
circulated celebrating the coming of a new era: 
Long live the illustrious Walker, 
Long live the united Fatherland, 
Death to the Aristocracy! 
Join the ranks of 
William the wise, 
Who leads us to victory 
Over the Conservatives 
Who inhabit America. 
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Long live Liberty! 
Death to Conservatism!207 
 
One of Walker’s first duties would be the establishment of a government. Ponciano Corral 
became Minister of War in the new government. Parker French, an associate of Walker’s from 
the United States became Minister of the Treasury. The rest of the cabinet, to Corral’s dismay, 
was made up of Liberal Democrats. Corral quickly looked to obviate Walker’s power in 
Nicaragua by sending letters to Conservative leaders in Honduras, requesting their support in 
removing Walker before his control was solidified. Walker had taken the precaution of making 
sure that each of the various cabinet officials had military bodyguards loyal directly to him. 
These letters from Corral were intercepted by these individuals, and delivered to Walker himself. 
Walker immediately took Corral into custody and had him court martialed. Since Corral admitted 
writing the letters, he was found guilty and sentenced to execution – with a recommendation that 
the commander-in-chief grant clemency (strangely, the new president was not directly a part of 
the process).208 Many encouraged him to grant mercy to Corral, but according to the San 
Francisco Herald such please were ignored: “on the countenance of Walker there was not a 
visible particle of emotion. His features were calm and placid, and his cold passionless gray eyes 
relaxed nothing of its ordinary frigidity.”209 The execution took place on November 8, 1855, 
shocking the Granadan elites and creating an undercurrent of opposition to Walker.210 This 
opposition was not forthright, but rather a removal of Nicaraguan elites to their estates. It was 
also somewhat prescient, as Walker would begin direct action against the elites of Nicaragua in 
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July of 1856.211 The land that was promised to citizens from the United States was acquired by 
Walker from the defeated elites. 
 John Wheeler immediately sought to establish his position as United States minister by 
calling upon Rivas during the negotiations, providing United States recognition to the newly 
formed government. In 1856, Padre Agustín Vijil was made ambassador to the United States 
from Nicaragua. He arrived in Washington, DC in May of 1856 and was presented to Secretary 
of State William L. Marcy, providing further support to the Nicaraguan government of Rivas and 
Walker.212 In supporting that decision, President Franklin Pierce stated, “It is the established 
policiy of the United States to recognize all governments without question of their source, or 
organization, or of the means by which the governing persons attain their power.”213 This 
recognition did not extend to the government formed by Walker himself when he was elected 
president in July of 1856. By that time one of Walker’s other cardinal mistakes had finally 
caught up to him. In February of 1856, Walker revoked the charter of the Accessory Transit 
Corporation and transferred all the concessions gained by Cornelius Vanderbilt to his rivals, 
Charles Morgan and C.K. Garrison. This gained Walker the enmity of Vanderbilt, and made the 
United States tycoon a formidable ally to the forces arrayed against Walker’s government. At the 
beginning of March, President Juan Rafael Mora of Costa Rica would declare war on the Walker 
government in Nicaragua. The rest of the Central American nations were not pleased by the 
Anglo presence dominating Nicaragua, and feared that he had plans to expand his empire beyond 
the singular nation.214 
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 Vijil’s time as minister in the United States was not as he had hoped. He was, indeed, 
recognized as the official representative of Nicaragua. Walker had attempted to use Parker 
French as his representative, but this had been poorly received. The appointment of Vijil led to 
greater willingness by the United States government to officially recognize Nicaragua. In April 
of 1856, Wheeler communicated to Marcy that Padre Vijil had been named Envoy Extraordinary 
and Minister Plenipotentiary from Nicaragua.215 His time in the United States would be 
extremely limited. Vijil did not speak much English, and he was met with ridicule and scorn 
from the other Latin American diplomats. Rather than seeing him as doing what was best for his 
country, he was seen as a collaborator and a traitor to his people. This was especially true for the 
Central American governments, as many of them were at war with Walker’s Nicaragua. Vijil 
was presented with another opportunity to present his point of view in July, during a rally in New 
York to support Walker. He was asked to speak, and his words were translated by a Mr. 
Appleton Oaksmith and published in El Nicaraguense: 
That he himself was engaged in sacred callings – one which leads mankind to a better and 
kinder appreciation of humanity and brings him nearer to his God – his life was passed 
within the quiet precinct of a church and many might thing it ill became him to engage in 
a matter disconnected with his profession in the political affairs of his country. But to 
such he would say that he came there on no common mission. There are duties which 
impel a man beyond the ordinary interests of church and State, and such are now 
impelling him in the grand errand which he has come here to perform. He had heard for 
thirty years the cannon of discordant factions booming through a land that God had 
intended for a paradise – he had seen the walls of His sacred edifice crumble beneath the 
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burning shot, and its most holy defiled to sanguinary purposes – he had seen families 
divided against each other and homesteads laid waste; and now, when by the infusion of 
new elements, there was a chance for all these things to end; when his people had 
adopted a government which would ensure internal tranquility; when brother was 
reconciled by brother, and father with son, the hand of aggression is raised against them 
by a neighboring State, who with Serviles in their ranks, and aided by one of the 
mightiest powers in Christendom, is marching to invade the territory and make it once 
more the theatre of bloodshed and misrule. Could he remain within his cloistered cell and 
see such things without adding his mite to the effort for his country’s good?216 
 
After only six weeks in the United States, Padre Vijil notified the Secretary of State that he 
would be leaving the United States, and that Tennessean John P. Heiss would be assuming the 
role of Charge d’ Affaires for Vijil. This ended the diplomatic efforts of Vijil, and his activity in 
the Walker government.217  
 In June of 1856, Walker hastened events along by declaring early elections and putting 
himself up against Patricio Rivas. On June 24, Walker became president in his own right of 
Nicaragua. On June 25, Rivas declared Walker a traitor. Costa Rica was already at war with 
Walker – after the election, the rest of the Central American nations would join together to 
remove the United States’ presence. Walker’s popularity dwindled in Nicaragua as promises of 
peace dissipated into so much smoke. This did not induce citizens of Nicaragua to join with the 
invading forces. Nicaraguans made up only an eighth of the overall force arrayed against 
William Walker’s government. In comparison, 3.5% of Costa Rica’s population involved 
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themselves in the war effort; only .5% of Nicaragua’s population joined in.218 After years of war, 
they were certainly willing to let others do the fighting for them. Walker was forced to retreat 
and eventually escape from Nicaragua. He did not leave before fulfilling the fears of the 
Granadan citizens from the previous year. As he was forced to retreat from Granada, he ordered 
the burning of the city, leaving a sign simply saying “aquí fue Granada.”219  
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
 
Vijil had returned to Nicaragua on July 6 of 1856, and found that his support of Walker 
had discredited him throughout Nicaragua while ironically leading to the ends he had envisioned. 
Walker had promised an end to the wars that had plagues Nicaragua for decades, but that 
promise proved itself an empty one. Once his Liberal supporters realized Walker’s true vision 
they closed ranks against him politically. Both Liberal and Conservative elites sealed this 
unification on September 12, 1856.220 This agreement moved the capital of Nicaragua to 
Managua to eliminate strife between the city-states and provide a basis for a new government 
and provided a framework for the newly united elites of Nicaragua to coordinate with other 
Central American rulers. The threat posed by Walker and his filibusters provided a unity of 
purpose in a region that had previously been torn by near constant warfare. 
The united forces of Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras invaded northwestern 
Nicaragua and reclaimed León from control of the filibusters. This international force continued 
on to capture Managua while an army from Costa Rica moved forward from the South to 
advance upon Walker and his forces. The efforts from the South were aided by one of the 
enemies that Walker had made, Cornelius Vanderbilt. With agents and financing from 
Vanderbilt, Costa Rican troops took control of the transit route and forced Walker’s forces to 
retreat to Rivas. With his supply line eliminated, Walker was forced to engage in a final retreat 
with his men. On May 1, 1857 the United States Navy arranged for transport for both Walker 
and his men back to the United States.221 
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Walker himself remained obsessed with Nicaragua, and refused to accept his departure in 
1857 as the end. He led three subsequent filibustering expeditions to Nicaragua with no success. 
His final voyage to Nicaragua occurred in 1860 when he attempted to return via Honduras. The 
British navy took custody of Walker, and turned him over to Honduran authorities for execution. 
The support for Walker’s endeavors that had burned so brightly in 1856 had dissipated by 1860 
as the United States was more concerned with internal divisions and far less interested in further 
expansion. The United States Civil War would put an end to filibustering efforts in Latin 
America. 
The two years of Walker’s regime in Nicaragua would provide the impetus towards 
unification that had eluded the nation following independence. The National War had originated 
as a produce of the ongoing conflict between Liberal and Conservative elites but ironically 
proved to be a catalyst for cooperation. Patricio Rivas returned to the presidency of Nicaragua 
following the departure of William Walker and served in that office until June of 1857. Symbolic 
of the efforts to unite opposing factions, Nicaragua adopted a bipartisan presidency. Liberal 
General Máximo Jérez and Conservative General Tomás Martínez both held office until the end 
of 1857.  In November of that year a Nicaraguan Constituent Assembly convened and named 
General Martínez as the sole president. Liberals and Conservatives also united in the creation of 
a new constitution in 1858 wherein they agreed to a greater degree of cooperation. The 
complicity of the Liberal elites in bringing Walker to their shores has not been completely 
forgotten. Martínez would serve as Nicaragua’s president until 1867 and be succeeded by six 
Conservative presidents.  This orderly Conservative rule would last in Nicaragua until near the 
end of the century.222 
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These political events diluted interest in the Nicaraguan canal. The instability of the 
National War had combined with the opening of a railroad across Panama to the detriment of the 
Nicaraguan route. The Nicaraguan transit route was closed following the war and not reopened 
until 1862. The United States would maintain the viability of this route throughout the nineteenth 
century, finally ended with the opening of the Panama Canal in 1914. The economic impetus for 
the involvement of the United States in Nicaragua would never come to fruition. 
Vijil’s education had made him an admirer of the United States and its astonishing 
development, which echoed the hopes he had for his own nation. His idealism reflected feelings 
common to many in the years before the arrival of Walker, and embodied the hopes that 
Nicaragua could attain both peace and prosperity. The intersection of Walker and Vijil’s 
Nicaragua led to a united Nicaraguan government and decades of peace while at the same time 
ending the dream of prosperity presented by the transit route. For his support of Walker, Vijil 
received persecution for the rest of his life. As a reward for his failed efforts toward peace his 
property was confiscated and his position in Granada eliminated.223 Vijil retired from public life 
and was eventually sent to the distant parish of Teustepe, where he served until he died on June 
6, 1867.224  
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Jerónimo Pérez. [Managua]: Fondo de Promoción Cultural, Banco de América, 1975. 
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